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The main objective of this research was to assemble and
review those issues currently affecting the acquisition
process in Federal Government, with emphasis on the
Department of Defense. The individual topics discussed are:
The Acquisition Process, Competition in Acquisition, The
Federal Acquisition Regulation, and The Weapon System
Warranty. In addition, a chapter is dedicated to
conclusions and recommendations regarding the selected
issues. A formated Appendix is provided for inclusion into
the Manual, of Acquisition Togiss, September 1983 edition,
compiled by the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California. The Appendix will add the topics discussed in
this research to this most useful publication, bringing it
up-to-date with current acquisition policy.
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I- INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The basic objective of this study was to assemble and
study the issues most affecting federal procurement during
1984.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
In light of the above objective, the basic research
question addressed was:
What are the significant issues affecting Federal
Government procurement functions during 1984, and how
do they affect the Department of Defense contracting
officer?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The bulk of the material contained in this study was
obtained through a comprehensive literature search. In
addition to searching currently available acquisition
literature, sources such as the Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the resources of the
National Contract Management Association (NCMA) were used.
Current and proposed Department of Defense (DOD)
acquisition instructions, directives, and regulations, as
well as similar guidance from other agencies were consulted.
Information from the Naval Postgraduate School Library, the
Department of Administrative Science Acquisition Library,
8
and theses written by former Naval Postgraduate School
students was compiled and reviewed.
Several symposiums and procurement-related meetings were
attended in the interest of obtaining current data on
contracting issues. Personal interviews were also
conducted with personnel from all aspects of the military
and civilian procurement arena.
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of this study is limited to four topics
selected by the writter as being among the most significant
issues affecting federal acquisition in 1984. These issues
The Acquisition Process
Compet it ion
The Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Weapon System Warranty
The direction of the study was to provide the government
contracting officer with a brief synopsis of the historical
perspective, content, implications, and possible future
direction of legislation affecting federal acquisition in
the topical areas.
As a benifit of this study, the topics discussed ^re
synopsized in Appendix A with the intent that it be included
as a revision to the Manual of Acguj.si.ti.on logics, a desk
reference for acquisition managers maintained by the Naval
Postgraduate School.
E. LIMITATIONS
Due to the nature of this study, only major issues
affecting each topic a^e discussed. A comprehensive review
of all related action and correspondence was deemed to be
too voluminous, and would be detrimental to the scope of the
study.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis flows in a logical sequence, begining with
an overview of the DOD acquisition process. Following is a
discussion of the issues selected for review. Chapter VI
will present the conclusions and recornendat ions of the
study. An appendix follows providing a synopsis of the
reviewed issues.
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II- IHE ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
During the 1960s, increasing political pressure was
being applied to Congress, the departments, and agencies of
Federal Government to trim the costs of major military and
space systems. The Department of Defense (DOD) was the
major recipient of criticism regarding the perceived
excessive expenditures of tax money for weapon system
acquisit ion.
The primary complaint of numerous sources was that cost
control measures employed by DOD were ineffective in holding
down system acquisition costs.
B. THE EftRLY YEARS
Robert McNarnara, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) during
the early sixties, answered the charges of ineffective
government control by introducing several wide-ranging
policies to control the DOD system acquisition process.
These innovations included incentive contracting, the
planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) and
several other concepts designed to give government
contracting officials and managers clearer visibility and
cost control over their programs CRef. 13.
Throughout the 1960s other programs for cost control
were introduced, including total package procurement and the
11
concept of life-cycle costing. The goal in all of these
packages was the reduction of cost overruns in military
procurement
.
By 1969 new emphasis was being placed on the issue of
defense acquisition and management- David Packard, the new
Deputy Secretary of Defense, issued a memorandum in May of
that year establishing the Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC), which functioned within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to advise the SECDEF on
the status and readiness of each major defense system. This
information was used by the top defense managers within OSD
to coordinate and evaluate the procession of work from one
phase of the acquisition process to another. This was a
major deviation from pervious policy in that under the
Packard guidance, OSD became a monitoring and milestone
decision-maker, rather than a detailed director of the
defense systems acquisition process CRef. 2.1
.
Later in the year, a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was
commissioned by the President and SECDEF to examine the area
of defense acquisition and management. To give the issue
more "teeth," Congress created, via public law, the Commis-
sion of Government Procurement (COGP). This body was tasked
to study and recommend methods to enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of economical government procurement CRef. 33.
In December of 197£ the Commission made 149
recommendations: 8£ required executive branch action and 67
IE
required legislative action. The major outcome of the
report led to the organization of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the formation of the Federal
Acquisition Institute (FftI). The former establishment
formulated government—wide acquisition policy and
regulation, while the latter focused on enhancing
acquisition education for the federal procurement workforce.
CRef. 43
C. OMB CIRCULAR ft- 109
In 1376, many of the recommendations of the C06P became
codified by the issuance of OMB Circular ft- 109 by OFPP,
titled Mgjor Systems Begkli.sit i.ons. The thrust of this
policy was directed at reducing federal program cost
overruns. Within DOD, it assisted in diminishing the
controversy voiced over the previous two decades on the
necessity of acquiring new weapon systems. CRef. 53
While ft-109 policy was closely patterned after the DOD
directives of the 5000 series, it enhanced the requirements
for top-level management within DOD to employ early
direction of research and development efforts to satisfy
mission needs and goals, along with the requisite management
of the budgeting and contracting process CRef. &1 .
SECDEF responded to the policy by appointing the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to the
position of Defense Acquisition Executive (DftE) . The DAE
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was tasked with being the principle advisor to SECDEF for
the acquisition of defense systems and material. In
addition, SECDEF called for the revision of the DOD
Directive (DODD) 5000.1 and Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, the
primary policies for DOD major system acquisition. The
revisions were aimed at requiring additional attention by
DOD managers at the "front end" of their programs; i.e., in
the establishment of the need for a program, and for the
integration of the project with the capabilities,
priorities, and resources of DOD as a whole.
While considered major achievements in the definition
and refinement of the acquisition process, some people felt
the publication of these policies led to emphasis upon
studying the problems associated with procurement rather
than actually implementing solutions CRef. 71 .
D. ACQUISITION IN THE EIGHTIES
In a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Material dated £5
November 1981, G. A. Sawyer, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics), stated: CRef. 8U
...I believe it is vitally important that we reded i cat
e
ourselves to better business paractices, and find
improved ways to manage our industrial base.
Achievement of the full effect of these principles,
which are the cutting edge of the acquisition process,
requires the assignment of our finest talent. We must
always remember that our Systems Commands ^re just as
much a part of the industrial base as the giants of
industry. It is evident we are not going to achieve our
objective of a 600 ship Navy by repeating the mistakes
of the past.
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These "mistakes of the past" were also recognized by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, upon his
appointment to office. On £ March 1981, he chartered five
working groups, involving all service branches and welcoming
input from industry as well, to make recommendations
regarding the improvement of the federal acquisition
process. On 31 March the working groups reported their
findings to Mr. Carlucci, who took the issues to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and other top management officials. CRef. 9D
1. The !lQarl.ucci_ Initiatives^.
On 30 April Mr. Carlucci identified 31 actions for
implementation by DOD to improve the acquisition process,
adding one more action on £7 July. The major emphasis of
the 3£ actions was to achieve enhanced readiness, reduce
acquisition costs, and shorten the acquisition time.
Specifically, the actions, commonly known as the "Carlucci
Initiatives," were designed to promote decentralization and
participative management, improve the planning and execution
of weapon system programs, and strengthen the industrial
base that supports DOD. Increasing the readiness of weapon
systems and reducing the administrative requirements in the
acquisition process were additional goals of the actions.
CRef. 103
The "Carlucci Initiatives," or the Department of Defense
Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP) as it was formally
known, generated much excitement in military acquisition
circles. Colonel G. D. Brabson, USAF, in his Autumn 1981
article in Q2£!£gEts» describes the excitement as corning in
part: CRef. 113
... by the fact that the services have been involved in
the development of the actions from the first day.
Thus, even the generation of the actions illustrates the
participative management that Mr. Carlucci is seeking.
The excitement also stems from the realization that, for
the first time in many years, some real changes in the
acquisition process may be possible.
By October of 1981, 11 of the 3£ actions had been
accomplished, the majority being in the area of
decentralization and participative management. In addition,
ten of the remaining actions were in the progress of being
completed. Funding, always a major factor in the
accomplishment of any program, was provided in the Fiscal
Year 198£ Budget in amounts commensurate to the achievement
of the remaining action objectives.
£. The "New" DOD 5000 Series
In March of 198£, another major revision of the DOD
Directive 5000.1 series was issued. This revision focused
on the decentralization of management responsibility in the
system acquisition programs, and listed the following seven
"Acquisition Management Principles and Objectives:" CRef.
1£D
Effective design and price competition for defense
systems shall be obtained to the maximum extent
practicable to ensure that defense systems are cost-
effective and a.r^e responsive to mission needs.
Improved readiness and sustainabi 1 ity are primary
objectives of the acquisition process. Resources to
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achieve readiness will receive the same emphasis as
those required to achieve schedule or performance
objectives. fis a management precept, operational
suitability of deployed weapon systems is art objective
of equal importance with operational effectiveness.
Reasonable stability in acquisition programs is
necessary to carry out effective, efficient, and timely
acquisit ions.
Here the directive states that five concepts shall be
followed to ensure stability is achieved. Effective long
range planning, considering "evolutionary" alternatives in
place of solutions at the frontier of technology, and
estimating and budgeting in a realistic manner are the first
three. Planning to achieve economical rates of production,
coupled with the maintenance of surge capacity and realistic
mobilisation plans, and the development of art acquisition
strategy early in the inception of each program were the
final issues.
Next, the objectives addressed the following issues:
To promote efficiency in the acquisition process,
authority will be delegated to the lowest levels of the
Componenet at which a comprehensive view of the program
rests. Responsibility and accountability must be
clearly established.
A cost—effect ive balance must be achieved among
acquisition costs, ownership costs of major systems, and
system effectiveness in terms of the mission to be
performed.
Cooperation with U. S. allies in the acquisition of
defense systems will be maximized to achieve the highest
practicable degree of standardization and interoperabi-
lity of equipment, and to avoid duplication of effort.
To protect the public interest and foster competition,
an ethical distance in business relationships between
defense and industry must be maintained, without such
buyei—seller relationship becoming adversarial.
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Technical collaboration with industry must be maintained
to achieve major system acquisition objectives and meet
technological challenges.
Major deviations from previous policy (the I960 versions
of DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2) were stated in this new
Directive and the follow-on instruction, DODI 5000. £, issued
8 March 1983. First, in keeping with the decentralization
concept, the mission needs determination was incorporated
into the planning, programing, and budgeting system (PPBS)
.
What was formerly known as the Mission Element Needs
Statement (MENS), was now submitted as the Justification for
Major System New Start (JMSNS) in the service Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) package. Secondly, the new
milestone of "program go-ahead" was not rigidly tied to the
beginning of full-scale development. This allowed the DSftRC
a more accurate view of costs, supportabi 1 ity, testing, and
other managrnent issues prior to a decision to commit to the
completion of full-scale development, production, and
deployment. CRef. 13]
Another major issue revised by the new policy was the
decision to start production. This issue now rested in the
hands of the service component, rather than with the SECDEF
as under previous policy, as long as there was no breach of
milestone II thresholds. Furthermore, the DSftRC review
thresholds for both Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) projects and production procurement
actions were doubled to *£00 million and *1 billion (Fiscal
18
Year 1988 dollars), respectively, thus decentralizing by one
level of management a significant number of programs, as
long as these thresholds were not breached CRef. 143. A
final change was in the reduction in size and number of
reports required for DSARC review. Starting with the JMSNS
previously mentioned, this final change also included the
compilation of three documents into one System Concept Paper
at milestone II, the requirement validation point, and the
elimination of one report and condensation of another
summary at the program go-ahead point. CRef. 153
As further proof of the reduction of administrative
overburden, DODI 5000.2 was changed, as stated by Under
Secretary of Defense R. D. De Lauer in a £8 February 1983
memorandum to the DSARC and military Acquisition Executives:
CRef. 163
...from a document containing both policies and
procedures to one that describes the operation of the
Defense Acquisition Review Council. Policy statements
which are pertinent but are described in other DOD
directives and instructions are now referenced only in
DODI 5000. S instead of being summarized as in earlier
editions of the Instruction.
3. IbS^^IZiS "Q£'L'5£'Iidated Initiatives^.
On 12 January 1983, Paul Thayer took the helm of the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) post, inheriting the
AIP and becoming responsible for the continued progress of
the project. Recognizing that the acquisition community
would question whether the loss of the original designer of
the AIP would have an impact on the future of federal
19
acquisition, Mr. Thayer promptly took the issue to task and
published a "Second Year-End Report" on 8 June of the same
year, sent under cover of a memorandum titled Guidance on
t.he? ftcgui.si.ti.on Improvement Program 1BIE1 CRef. 173.
Contained within the report was a summary of progress made
during the first two years of the ft I P. The report noted
that of the original 32 "Carlucci Initiatives," 13 had been
fully implemented, nine were in various stages of progress,
and the remainder required further action CRef. 183.
Consolidating 1£ of the original initiatives, Mr. Thayer
directed concentration on six areas to improve the
acquisition process. Program stability, mult i—year
procurement, stability in production rates, realistic
budgeting, improved readiness and support, and the
encouragement of competition were specifically singled out
for action. Mr. Thayer stated that these areas "offer both
the greatest management challenges and the highest potential
payoff." CRef. 193 Primary implementation responsibilities
for the consolidated actions were vested in the services,
with assistance from selected OSD staff offices which had
normal functional responsibl it ies in the respective area.
High-level working groups were established in the six areas
to monitor progress on the implementation and report to
DEPSECDEF. While the initial "Carlucci Initiatives" were
not forgotten by Thayer in his new drive for reform in the
£0
acquisition arena., definite emphasis was placed on the six
primary areas.
When looking at the Requisition Improvement Program at
this point, it becomes apparent that the underlying
management philosophy of DOD is to enhance program stability
and formulate realistic budget figures. In an article
written for the Novembei—December 1983 E£°.SC§iE!] M§St!^3§r, G.
D. Brabson cites several other issues that can be viewed as
being an insight to this philosoply. Reliability and
support abi 1 ity, competition, economic production rates,
incentives, pre—planned product improvement, concurrency,
tailoring, and initiative are named as the "key themes" of
the current management philosophy of OSD. CRef. £03
This "flavor" of management philosophy was well recieved
by the military departments, with evidence of the degree of
reform being clearly indicated in various official
correspondence and policies. Rear Admiral ft. ft. Giordano,
SC, USN, Commander of the Naval Supply System Command,
issued a memorandum on 6 January 1984 voicing his "Top
Concerns" for management guidance. This list, an update of
previous reviews in the area, indicated that the philosophy
set out by OSD was being closely followed. Out of the top
sixty concerns voiced by COMNftVSUPSYSCOM, over half were
directly related to the concepts underlying the management
guidance offered by OSD, with 8 out of the top 10 being
£1
almost identical to those "key themes" postulated by
Brabson. CRef. £13
4. BIE'lS Ihird Year
William H. Taft IV replaced Thayer as Deputy
Secretary of Defense early in 1984. Soon after taking
office, Taft released the third annual report on the DOD
acquisition program CRef. 223.
Stating that "considerable progress has been achieved"
in the implementation of the AIP over the previous three
years, Taft also voiced concern that "priority management
attention" must be continued so that the momentum would not
be lost CRef. 233. As proof of the progress, the new
DEPSECDEF cited the greater visibility for managing support
and readiness in the program budget review process, as well
as the improvement in planning for competition at all levels
of management. Additionally, Mr. Taft explained that
greater expansion in the use of independent cost estimates
for more accurate budgeting had been achieved.
Recalling the previous six initiatives set forth by
Thayer, Taft added a seventh initiative, enhancing
industrial base responsiveness, to direct attention to the
nation's defense industry capability to meet surge
production needs in the event of an emergency.
A more pressing issue addressed by Taft in the report
was the topic of achieving program stability. Citing this
22
as the initiative posing the most challenge to management,
Taft stated: CRef. 243
Despite the consensus that considerable savings c^n be
achieved through greater program stability, we have not
yet been able to find the solution to the complex
problem of program instability.
Naming budgetary contstraints imposed by both DOD and
Congress as the prime causes of program instability, Taft
notes that such constraints make it difficult to achieve
economic production rates for all but a very few major
programs. The new DEPSECDEF said that it would be "more
important that ever" to eliminate the lower priority
programs in order to achieve program stability and more
"economic" production rates CRef. £53.
Possible solutions to the problem a^re offered by the
report, starting with the basic decision process of DOD.
Aggressive decisions regarding vertical cuts, new starts,
and long-range planning on behalf of DOD are required to
achieve greater program stability. Other recommendations of
the report include: exploring the feasibility of a two-year
budget process; reviewing the Milestone II definition as set
by DODD 5000. 1, which the report concludes has not been used
beneficially; studying the Air Force concept of baseline /
cost cap approach to program management; and finally, the
establishment of the initiative on industrial base
considerat ions.
The report concluded that even though considerable
progress had been made, it was too early to assess the final
impact of the initiatives upon the quality of the
acquisition process or the degree of defense readiness.
Real savings experienced by the filP initiatives were also
stated as being elusive and difficult to assess, since those
savings that are reported express cost avoidance associated
with certain programmatic decisions. The net figure, which
considered other program decisions inconsistent with
management initiatives, was absent in the Service's report.
E. THE OUTLOOK FOR ACQUISITION
It is evident that the initiatives of the acquisition
improvement program are viable and important to the future
of federal procurement. Despite continued public exposure
to the "horror stories" befalling government agencies in
acquisition matters, headway is being made. Senator Dan
Quayle, chairman of the Senate firmed Services Committee's
Task Force on Selected Defense Procurement Matters, cited
several of the "success stories" in an attempt to put the
issue into perspective. CRef. £63
The value of competitive awards in DOD rose to $47.8
billion at the end of Fiscal Year 1983, up from $£5.
1
billion in Fiscal Year 1980.
The number of competitive awards in DOD has shown a
similar jump from 4.4 million in Fiscal Year 1980 to 5.5
million in Fiscal Year 1983.
£4
The renovated battleship Iowa was delivered by Ingalls
Shipbuilding within budget and £ 1/2 months earlier than
called for in the original contract.
Through the use of concurrenecy the Navy saved $£8
million in Fiscal Year 1983 by combining spare parts and
production component buys on the F/A-18 aircraft.
The fiir Force has implemented a successful program for
aircraft engines that combines dual sourcing and data
right provisions, two key programs in the AIP. In
addition, the contractor provided the most extensive
warranty to date on the engine.
The F-16 fighter program, currently under mult i -year
contract, has seen over 1 , 000 aircraft delivered at or
below cost. The unit cost of the aircraft has decreased
7. 4* in constant year dollars since 1983.
Greater emphasis is being placed on keeping down costs
rather than buying material faster, which was prevalent
in the mid-seventies. Personnel incentives are being
offered and awarded to DOD employees who are active in
keeping down costs via watching for mis—priced items and
indications of contractor fraud.
fin equal number of dissenting views c^n be found,
however, that indicate serious problems still abound in the
acquisition process. In an address to the Winter Regional
Conference of the National Contract Management Association,
held 9 February 1984 in Sacramento California, Eldon H.
Crowell of the firm Crowell and Moring postulated that the
enactment of legislation upon the acquisition process only
worsens the ills that they were enacted to cure. Citing the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FftR) , the process of
certifying claims under the Contract Disputes ftct , and the
creation of the Inspector General for the Department of
Defense as proof of his theorem, Mr. Crowell airs the view
that the acquisition process iri federal government is
becoming mired in complexity and legal litigation. CRef. £73
The FPR was intended to provide a uniform regulation for
all federal contracts. However, according to Mr. Crowell,
the FOR suffers from several shortcomings that result in a
non—uniform system for procurement. While the regulation
prohibits inconsistent agency supplements, the latitude
provided to the agency head in implementing the FRR and
adapting it to the particular needs of the agency may well
grant expansion, proliferation, and redundancy at the local
level. Mr. Crowell is concerned that the net result of this
action is a non-uniform system, as each agency will
interpret the FAR without regard to the interpretations
offered by other agencies. CRef. 283
From a legal viewpoint, Mr. Crowell states that even
though the FAR was rewritten for the sake of greater
clarity, lawyers will argue that the different words used
will have different meanings, even though no substantive
changes were intended. CRef. £33
The issue of certification of claims is viewed by Mr.
Crowell as being a nightmare of legal litigation and
hardship. The courts will have to decide on all aspects of
the issue before contractors have a clear—cut answer to the
implications of the requirement. In the meantime, according
to Mr. Crowell, contractors will have to certify "everything
in sight" in order to escape legal complications from the
£6
certification issue. He further states that the net result
of this action is the bearing of enormous costs for
taxpayers and contractors alike, since the Disputes fict has
failed, in his view, in its most fundamental purpose: the
facilitation of the just and expeditious disposition of
contract disputes. CRef. 3i3D
In regard to the Inspector General issue, Mr. Crowe 11
states that Congress created the position without evidence
that it was actually required. The underlying "rhetoric of
the times" dictated that a Congressional vote against the IG
would have been construed as a vote for "fraud, waste, and
abuse." The creation of the IG and the resultant reporting
requirements place it in direct competition with the Defense
Contract Audit Agency, resulting in the two factions
competing against each other for auditing "scoops." Mr.
Crowell stated that this would only cause problems for both
the contractors and the substantive defense programs as the
two activities try to out-IG each other. CRef. 313
In conclusion, Mr. Crowell painted a gloomy picture of
the future of the federal procurement process. Noting the
historical "lack of trust" that Congress has in the federal
acquisition system, and citing the increased legislative
activity in procurement reform being indicative of a.r\
increasingly active role in legislating changes to the
process, he feels that: CRef. 32D
£7
This trend will not abate for the forseeable future. If
rny theorem about the negative effects of Congressional
procurement legislation proves correct, the process will
experience difficult times for years to come.
In an attempt to confront such questions raised by Mr.
Crowell, much activity is undertaken by various groups
within the federal acquisition arena. One such gathering
involved members of the tr i-services, the private sector,
and other interested bodies, at the Acquisition Strategy
Workshop, held 1-2 May 1984 at the Defense Systems
Management College, Fort Bel voir, Virginia.
Recognizing that the formulation of a viable acquisition
strategy is paramount to success in the pursuit of an
efficient procurement process, the workshop focused on
issues that addressed the importance of planning and
developing an in-depth acquisition strategy plan early—on in
the program. The workshop identified several important
problems surrounding the issue, mainly in the area of
assistance available to the program manager for guidance on
establishing an acquisition strategy. The workshop noted
that the Defense Systems Management College was in the
process of compiling the BE9.!ii5iti2D Strategy Guide, and
hoped that this publication would assist the manager in
addressing the problem. In addition, the workshop cited
that to be effective, a strategy must be: CRef. 333
...robust to meet tomorrow's challenge, must be flexible
but not break, must be valid but not direct, and must be
clear but not precise.
£8
Similar research is being undertaken in other areas of
acquisition management, and must continue to be exploited to
the maximum extent if a true reform of the federal
procurement process is to be achieved.
£9
III. COMPilHIQN IN BCQUISITION
ft. INTRODUCTION
Rapid growth in federal procurement in the past decade
prompted congressional action to provide leadership and
coordination in the procurement function. Competition, long
favored as the single best source of reducing costs in
acquisition, was seen as 3^n important key issue in the
congressional reform program.
In a 14 March 1984 memorandum to all Naval Supply Corps
Officers, Rear Admiral P. ft. Giordano, SC, USN, Chief of the
Supply Corps, quoted President Reagan as stating that
competition "is the single most important source of
innovation, efficiency and growth in our economy. " The
ftdmiral further stated that: CRef. 343
Competition makes good business sense, and I want to
make it clear that increasing competition must be a
primary objective of all personnel involved in logistics
management
.
^B. COMPETITION IN ACQUISITION
Under generally accepted economic terminology,
competition can be defined as the practice of two or more
parties, acting independently, to secure the business of a
third party under the most favorable economic conditions
CRef. 353.
3tZi
The benefits of competition can be widespread and
favorable to the American free enterprise sytern. Such
benefits as the achievement of cost savings, a broadening of
the industrial base, drawing participation from varied
sources of technology, improving the technology acquired,
and improving the delivery schedule ca.n be achieved CRef.
363.
However, competition c&rt also pose several problems.
The competition process, to be effective, requires an
appreciable amount of time devoted to planning and other
administrative matters. Additionally, the cost of injecting
competition into what would have been a sole source
procurement can be counter—product ive to the overall
financial health of a project.
In the long-run, however, it has been long recognised
that competition is one of the few methods of ensuring that
prices for goods are based on the needs of society, in this
case, a strong national defense. Since this need is so
great, it is possible that no price is too high to pay for
such a necessity, and strong forces in the market may
attempt to exploit this fact.
The philosophy of the market driving the price of an
item and competition being the regulating force in society
was postulated by Adam Smith, who stated: CRef. 373
An invisible hand will regulate the supply and demand
for a good by establishing a price which will clear the
market of all goods in a given time period.
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An opposing view was presented in 193£ by Berle and
Means, who found that corporate wealth, rather than being
diffused and shared by many small firms, was increasingly
being concentrated into the hands of a relatively small
number of companies CRef. 38], The effect of this can be
seen by the fact that over eighty percent of corporate
wealth in the United States is now found in only twenty
percent of the US corporations CRef. 393 . The significance
of this issue is the fact that the concentration of wealth
gives a small number of firms the major leverage in control
over prices. As stated by Colonel M. D. Martin and Major R.
F. Golden, USAF, of the Air Force Business Research
Management Center: CRef. 40D
No longer does the market determine a market price in
the majority of cases, rather corporate officials who
produce and sell their products in a sole source
(monopoly) situation develop prices which may or may not
reflect cost plus a reasonable return.
Between these two types of market structure, pure
competition and monopoly, there exist two other forms of
marketing: oligopoly and duopoly.
Oligopoly can best be described as a market of few
sellers and many buyers. The products are similar in form,
fit and function, but are marketed as different via varied
forms of advertising by the producers. One firm usually
holds a slightly monopolistic control over the others and
basically sets the price.
Duopoloy is charect er i zed by two firms existing in the
marketplace, one of which is dominant and has control over
price and industry operation. The other firm ca.ri survive
solely with the support of an outside agency, i.e.,
government intervention. This type of market has been
called "artificial" by economists, and is quite commonly
found in the government weapon system environment.
In the post World War II marketplace, a large number of
monopolistic firms were producing a majority of the goods
for the military arena. In the years since, this has been
the strategy of the defense industry since it is in their
best interests to promote their research and development to
the point where they are the only firm that cart supply the
needed technology in their state—of-the—art field. Under
the high—tech defense market, this leads to a large number
of sole-source procurements being made by the Government,
which, in fact, may be acting as a monopsony due to the
unique nature of the defense market place. This is fostered
by the degree of specialization and market segmentation
found in defense programs.
The crux of the matter is that over the years, fewer
firms have been getting a larger share of the defense
dollar, or better stated, the taxpayers' dollar. This
leads to the eventual monopsony (the Government) dealing
with a few select monopolies (the surviving defense
contractors), or at best to a dual-oligopoly where segements
of government interact with a few suppliers. Either way,
the small businessman, that most important cog in the
nation's wheel of industrial fortune, is left out of the
circle.
C. THE NEED FOR COMPETITION IN THE DOD
Early studies by the DOD indicated that major savings
were possible through the introduction of competition. ft
197£ study undertaken by the ftrmy Electronics Command found:
CRef. 41D
Introducing competition into a sole-source procurement
would result in An expected acquisition cost savings of
40 percent to 50 percent.
Colonel Martin and Major Golden list several studies
undertaken between 1974 and 1979 that provide savings
between ten and twenty percent when sole-source procurements
were switched to open competition CRef. 4£3
.
ft key issue here is that these studies did not fully
explore the effects of the increased administrative costs
that would arise from the competitive acquisition strategy.
In fact, a recent GftO study on the cost effectiveness of
Dual Sourcing concluded that there still remains a great
deal of indecision regarding the financial effectiveness of
competition CRef. 433. However, studies such as these
acquired the ear of the congressional bodies, and the theory
of increasing competition to decrease weapon system costs
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was thrust into the forefront of a deficit—reducing social
movement
.
National security policy mandates that the nation remain
militarily strong, and that the private sector is the source
of required goods and services. The strength of the
nation's defense relies heavily upon the technological
expertise and cornpentency of the defense industry, and their
production of high technology weapon systems. Since
competition has been historically viewed as a.r\ inhibitor to
technological innovation, the push to "economise" weapon
system procurement met with some resistance in DOD.
fi major fear of the DOD hierarchy was that increased
emphasis on competition would remove the impetus of
innovatitve technological advances enjoyed by the "think
tanks" and other brainstorming groups. These groups, made
up of individual researchers or research teams, provided
much of the unique skills required to develop "state-of-the-
art" weapon systems. It was feared that competition during
the research and basic conceptual phases would restrict the
amount of scientific information made available to the
government. CRef. 4-2.1
However, in later phases of weapon system development,
namely the concept validation phase, competition may be
highly benefical to the attainment of technological
supremacy. fin example of this would be in the development
and testing of a specific aircraft type. Non-competitive
contracts are let in the initial stages to different firms
to produce an aircraft that conforms to basic conceptual
goals. A competitive fly-off is chosen as the contracting
method to delineate which aircraft would be selected for
production. Thus, in the initial stages the innovative
skills and resources of the firms are not hindered by strict
specifications: rather they are allowed to improvise and
push the frontier of technology in order to produce the best
product for the specified goal. After the fly-off has
demonstrated the acceptability of the product, competition
cart enter the contracting process in the selection of
manufacturers to produce the components of the system. fls
further development and testing progresses, drawings and
other technical data will standardize, allowing for further
competition using advertised methodology.
Other measures were employed to induce competition
into the weapon system acquisition process. Anti-trust
action to change market structures and legislation to reduce
merger activity indirectly affected DOD in their selection
of contractors. Research activity verified that such
competitive contracting approaches, disciplined adherence
to formal source—select ion procedures, increased use of
component breakout, and broadened use of two-step formal
advertising in the research and development arena. will all
enhance the economic reform of the acquisition process.
CRef. 453
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In the final analysis, it became apparent to DOD that
competition could and would be benefical to the weapon
system acquisition process if used in the proper context.
Basic concepts exist that provide for economic return while
allowing for technological supremacy when competition is
applied in the proper stages of the acquisition process.
Proper judgment would be required to apply competitive
mechanisms in the appropriate phase, and planning and
control would be vital to the proper execution of the
program.
D. IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN DOD
In February 1982, the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) submitted its second proposal to Congress
regarding the development of a uniform, comprehensive,
innovative procurement system within federal agencies.
Following this submission, on March 17 1982, Presidential
Executive Order 12352 was published, charging OFPP and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with the task of
providing leadership, policy guidance, and coordination
necessary to achieve the proposed system.
Specific problems identified by Executive Order 12352
included the inadequacy of existing competition in the
acquisition process. In a General Accounting Office (GP.0)
report by the Comptroller General on progress of Federal
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Procurement Reform under 12352, the following was stated
regarding this issue: CRef. 463
Competition is curtailed by procurement complexities,
funding constraints, restrictive specifications, limited
market knowledge and planning, and absence of
contracting officer independence.
DOD response to the Executive Order came on 30 June
1982, with a letter to the Deputy Director of OMB stating
that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering (USDRE) was appointed the Procurement Executive
for DOD. His responsibilities included overseeing
development of the agency procurement system, enhancing
career management of the procurement work force, and
evaluation and certification that system performance met
with approved criteria.
Further indication that DOD was striving to meet the
goals of furthering competition in the defense industry was
in the publication of the Department of Defense Directive
5000.1 on 29 March 1982. This directive, titled "Major
System Acquisitions," stated that as ^n acquisition
management principle and objective: CRef. 473
Effective design and price competition for defense
systems shall be obtained to the maximum extent
practicable to ensure that defense systems are cost-
effective and are responsive to mission needs.
ft DOD—funded management study listed six factors that
would have to be overcome to meet the objectives of
increasing competition. These were: a significant lack of
data; a lack of resources; the cost in both time and money
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of acquiring new sources; the risk of getting new sources;
obsolescence of standardized parts; and, the overall
complexity of the acquisition process CRef. 4811.
DODD 50iZi0. 1 directed management attention to many of
these deficiencies by requiring in-depth analysis and
documentation of the acquisition process. The Integrated
Program Summary (IPS), a detailed report on the total
program from the initial threat assessment to proposed
future implications of the project, required attention to
planning and the impact of all aspects of competition to the
project. (The IPS is submitted when requested by DSP.RC) .
Alternative systems were required to be explored, whether
the sources existed or were being developed. Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) was mandated, with
attention directed to life cycle costs and af fordabi 1 i t y.
Interoperability and standardization aspects were required
to be discussed, with emphasis on the overall effectiveness
of the system. In summary, the major system acquisition
cycle included principles that were consistent with
recognized reform actions needed to induce competition into
defense procurement.
The Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, issued a
memorandum on 9 September 1982, that voiced his cc>r\cerr\ over
the competition issue: CRef. 493
I am convinced that we must give greater attention to
obtaining competition in the placement of contracts by
all Department of Defense components. The benefits
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derived from competition are well recognized.
Competition serves to reduce cost, improve quality, and
enhance the industrial base that is so critical to
defense mobilization. The policy to obtain maximum
competition is prescribed by the firmed Services
Procurement fict , and it is reiterated by Executive Order
1£35£ and at various points in the Defense Acquisition
Regulation. It is our responsibility to assure that
this policy is adhered to rigorously.
The Secretary continued by stating that all DOD
components were to place maximum emphasis on competitive
procurement, and that contracts would be placed on other
than a competitive basis "only when clearly justified.
"
CRef. 5iZiD His platform regarding the extent of support to
competition was clearly put forth in the latter portion of
the memo: CRef. 51]
No type of purchase is automatically excluded from this
direction to maximize competition and this direction
applies regardless of the level of the requesting
official or the importance of the subject matter of the
contract. Particular attention should be given to those
areas where the assumption traditionally has been made
that competition is not available.
The Defense Requisition Improvement Program (DfilP)
,
first implemented in 1981, received renewed emphasis on the
competition issue in mid 1983 CRef. 5£D . Of the 3£ original
acquisition improvement program initiatives, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer decided that six issues
were significantly important enough to address in a 5 May
1983 memorandum. Of these six issues, the encouragment of
competition was listed as one of importance CRef. 533. ft
projected $14 billion was expected to be saved over the span
of the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) due to the DftIP reforms
4*3
alone, with competition in Naval contracts being cited as a
large portion of the savings CRef. 543.
However, more than token resistance remained in the
field to the concept of increased competition. In a 7 April
1983 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics), the General Counsel of the
Navy Walter T. Skallerup, Jr., reported that there still
rema i ned a.rt " i nst i t ut i ona 1 b i as for noncompet i t i ve
contracting. " CRef. 553 While the bias was not attributed
to any single source, the record of Defense statistics
demonstrated that competitive contracting was not as
prevalent as was desired by the hierarchy of DOD. "Repeated
policy pronouncements by senior Defense officials" and
"case-by—case challenges by contracting officers" were cited
by Skallerup as major contributors to this deficiency.
Competition was being used as a last resort by the majority
of contracting officers, Skallerup concluded. CRef. 563
1. The Navy Competition Advocate General
On 4 August 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
officially stated the Department of the Navy Acquisition
Management Policy. One of the 15 initiatives for immediate
action included in this Policy was the establishment of the
Department of the Navy Competition Advocate. While
recognizing that much progress had been made in promoting
competition over the previous two years, Secretary Lehman
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also admitted that the resistance was significant enough to
demand more attention to the issue. CRef. 573
The actual establishment of the position of Naval
Competition Advocate was accomplished through the Naval
Material Command (NAVMAT) notice 5438, dated £ August 1983.
In this notice, Commodore Stuart F. Piatt, SC, USN, was
named as a "general" in the Navy: the Competition Advocate
General (CAG). His extensive list of duties included: CRef.
583
...devoting special attention to areas which offer CtheU
greatest opportunity for cost saving through increased
competition, such as the POM and budget process, the
ARB/CEB/DNSARC/DSARC process, acquisition strategies and
plans, spares breakouts, technical documentation for
procurement, and the quality of material. He will
implement new competition initiatives for programs such
as subcontracting (GFE/CFE), contractor support
services, and resources for multiple sourcing.
To "get the ball rolling," President Reagan lent his
support to the issue in a memorandum dated 11 August 1983.
Addressed to the heads of all departments and agencies, the
memo discussed his philosophy on competition and his concern
regarding the loss of benefit from not actively competing
federal procurement: CRef. 593
Competition is fundamental to our free enterprise
system. It is the single most important source of
innovation, efficiency, and growth in our economy. Yet,
far too often the benefits of competition are excluded
from the Federal procurement process — a process which
now results in expenditures of over $160 billion
annually. Numerous examples of waste and exorbitant
costs due to the lack of competition have been detailed
by the Congress and the press during recent months. . .
.
I call upon each of you to assure that competition is
the preferred method of procurement in your department
or agency.
As part of his concern over the lack of competition in
Federal procurement, President Reagan went on to state that
he had directed Don Sowle, the Administrator for Federal
Procurement Policy in the OMB, to issue a policy directive
on non-competitive procurement. The intent of the directive
was to establish government—wide restrictions on the use of
noncompet i t i ve procurement
.
P. major new concept brought about by the policy
directive was that any noncompetitive procurement under the
circumstances allowed in the directive, above a dollar
threshold established by the Agency Procurement Executive,
must be approved by the Agency Procurement Executive before
issuance of a solicitation. The war against noncompetitive
procurements was really starting to escalate.
With Presidential support, Congressional mandates, and a
bevey of newly appointed command competition advocates to
support him, Commodore Piatt set forth his "marching orders"
and attacked the competition issue head-on.
In his first letter to the officially designated
competition advocates, the Navy CAG stated that: CRef. £03
Competitive procurement represents the extension of the
principle of fairness into the defense acquisition
process. The public trust placed in those who obligate
public funds includes the assurance that a fair
opportunity will be provided to all who can meet the
government's needs.
One effective way to significantly reduce costs, and
thereby be able to afford our defense requirements, is
43
to increase the use of competition. The Navy is now
emphasizing competitive procurement strongly.
Commodore Piatt went on to note that in private
industry, which is not subject to such mandates on
increasing competition, the use of competition is seen
extensively in fostering the best economic posture possible.
He professsed : CRef. 613
Making use of the entrepreneurial spirit to achieve an
efficient allocation of resources as firms pursue a
competitive strategy in product development, production
and pricing will allow us to purchase the right product
at the right time for the right price in the most
efficient, effective manner.
It must be noted at this point, however, that the term
"competition" when used by private industry is not
necessarily used in the same context as it is by DOD. Under
commercial context, "competition" may refer to the practice
of competing as few as two select firms against each other,
regardless of the number of qualified suppliers available.
This is not the concept used by DOD, which views
competition, to be fair to all, as being among the total
population of qualified suppliers.
Pis guidance for the new competition advocates, several
specific actions were offered to assist in promoting the
"institutional advocacy for competition." CRef. S2.1
First, the competition advocates must underline their
commitment to the promotion of competition by action. Their
position must be such that everyone in the acquisition
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process recognizes that sole-source is to be considered only
as a last resort.
Since all sole-source justifications are reviewed by the
competition advocates, Commodore Piatt directed that they
use all resources available to ensure that the justification
is challenged wherever possible. Independent determination
of adequacy for sole-source procurement is paramount.
Competition advocates are directed to encourage planning
of each procurement to the maximum extent possible. CAG
instructed early involvement in the acquisition process to
ensure that competition is addressed as a strategy.
Expansion in the use of commercial specifications was
another issue addressed by Commodore Piatt. Technical
personnel were expected to develop specification packages
with the intent of fostering competitive procurement.
Command competition advocates 3ire directed to discourage the
use of restrictive or overstated government specifications
and contractor—proposed engineering designs which would
inhibit subsequent competitive procurement.
Making the performance of market research a routine part
of the procurement process was listed as another duty of the
local advocate. Public Law 98-72 mandates that any proposed
noncompetitive purchase over a certain specified level be
published in the Commerce Business Dail_y with the intent
that the government could then be made aware of any
previously unknown source. Such market research as more
frequent use of "sources sought" notices and other tapping
of available resources were directed.
Other issues addressed were checking follow—on buys, a
close reevaluation of contractors' claims to proprietary
rights in data, and ensuring that the program management
personnel are giving adequate opportunity to be trained in
competitive practices.
One of the most fruitful areas for competition outlined
by Commodore Piatt was in the area of contractor support
services being awarded as sole source. Breaking the
dependence on long— lived single-source contractor support
requires much planning and some time to achieve properly,
but must be addressed.
Likewise, unsolicited proposals by contractors offer the
potential to become sole—source contracts. Close
examination of the material or services offered is directed
to ensure that a source may not be available on an
unrestricted basis from other sources.
As a final guidance, Commodore Piatt directed that the
creation and maintanence of "aggressive interactive
dialogues and liaison with industry as well as within the
competition advocate community" be achieved CRef. &31 .
£. Standardization Through Competition
In a letter dated 5 April 1984, Commodore Piatt
addressed the Navy competition advocates on the subject of
standardizat ion.
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Long thought to be mutually exclusive with intelligent
competition, standardization was being increasingly seen
throughout the American marketplace. In fact, the practice
was observed to be thriving in a highly competitive
environment. Such items as spark plugs, computer chips, and
even personal computers were standardized and yet sold very
well in the competitive market.
Commodore Piatt stated his position on the
implementation of standardization in Naval acquisition:
CRef. 643
One objective of standardizing our weapon systems,
subsystems and components is to reduce total costs by
limiting the number of unique items, including equipment
furnished by prime contractors, which have to be bought,
managed, and used. Standardization certainly reduces
logistics costs because of easier maintenance and the
resultant lower training, manpower, support equipment,
and publications costs. Another benefit of
standardization is the improved efficiency and
effectiveness which comes from fleet users having common
equipment to operate. Here we see the benefit of life-
cycle costs.
The CAG further explains that standardization was not
new to the American defense industry, reaching back as far
as 1798 when Eli Whitney manufactured interchangeble parts
for muskets. Any part made by his process would fit in any
of his muskets of the same design, since by using special
jigs and design patterns for lay—out, all parts made were as
identical as possible. Hence the first mass—produced weapon
system in America. CRef. 653
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Commodore Piatt identified two programs in the DOD that
were aimed toward achieving defense standardization. The
first, the Department's parts control program, was directed
to use existing standard parts in the design of new
equipment. While industry complained that this inhibited
technological advancement, DOD stated that stable design and
complete specifications found in existing parts were of more
importance. The net effect on competition under this
program was that after a component becomes standardized, the
overall quantity to be bought generally increases as it is
used in various applications. The presence of proven
components, stable designs, and complete specifications lend
themselves to An effective competitive acquisit i t ion
program. CRef. 663
The second program in DOD was the "Like Equipment"
concept, where all ships, aircraft, or other system of a
specified class or type, use essentially the same standard
equipment. Configuration control is the key element in this
program, requiring indepth advance planning and foresight or.
the part of the program managers. Through buying all at
once or on a multi-year basis, a program manager could buy
several years' worth of component parts for a particular
ship class, and take advantage of lower acquisition costs
through large-volume buying. LRef. 673
"ft generic approach you should consider is to achieve
standardization not by identical equipment but by equipment
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which has the same form, fit, and function, " directed
Commodore Piatt CRef. 683 . Specifying input, output size
constraints and other critical requirements early—on in a
procurement action would allow competition without using a
"build-to-print" approach on the part of the contractor.
Thus, the contractor can utilize his own production process
and adapt it to the specifications of the project, thereby
reducing costs significantly over having to follow a
mandated manufacturing process that may not be compatible to
his operation. This approach is best suited to the
manufacture of consumable-type items, which a.re normally
produced in large quantities.
a. The Navy BOSS Program
The Navy Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS) program was
implemented to enhance acquisition of spare parts. One of
its initiatives was the emphasis on the DOD parts control
program to help keep acquisition costs of new parts to a
minimum. This program, commented Commodore Piatt, was
particularly useful in new programs where initial
development of a standard is easier than would be found in a
more advanced project CRef. 693.
b. The Navy SHARP Program
Commodore Piatt urged competition advocates to
familiarize themselves with the Standard Hardware
Acquisition and Reliability Program (SHARP) , an extension of
the 16-year-old Standard Electronic Modules (SEM) program
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developed by the Army. Under the SHARP concept, a limited
number of "standard electronic packaging" hardware would be
established. These packages would be designed to
accommodate new technology and would be both testable and
repairable. Alternate sources would be required for all of
the hardware as well. The result, as stated by the COG:
CRef. 7iZi:
...will be cost reduction through elimination of
dul plicate design or development efforts and competitive
reprocurement via validated design data packages. SHARP
is 3.^ excellent example of a program where competition
is both promoted and facilitated through
standard i zat ion.
E. THE EFFECT OF COMPETITION ADVOCACY
In an 11 May 1984 address to the National Contract
Manag rnent Association in Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Commodore
Piatt discussed the accomplishments of his competition
advocacy program.
Citing the upswing in the nation's economy and the
increase in growth rates, Commodore Piatt indicated that an
expansion of competition was bringing a "burst of
innovation, increased efficiency, and lower costs." CRef.
71D This robust industrial view coupled with the upswing in
the economy led the CAG to profess that Navy managers a.re
presented with a "most favorable climate" to increase
competition in procurement CRef. 7£D
.
Commodore Piatt went on to address the accomplishments
observed in the "quest for increased competition." First,
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during Fiscal Year 1983, $13. £ billion of the Navy's total
procurement dollars were awarded competitively. This
amounted to a Ai?"/- increase over the Fiscal year 19SE' level
CRef. 733. Pi second accomplishment was noted in the
competing of the first 15 follow—on ships of the "Perry"
class (FFG), resulting in a saving of over $1iZiiZi million
CRef. 743. Pi similar competition between two major
shipbuilders for a larger ship, the Regis Cruiser, netted a
$1013 million reduction over s^ri earlier sole-source award for
three ships CRef. 753.
The issue of contractor data rights was also addressed.
Commodore Piatt assured his audience that the Navy was
making inroads in obtaining data rights to allow competitive
reprocurment . Previously, contractor proprietary data
prohibited follow—on procurement from other than the
original source. Citing a case with Pratt and Whitney, the
CPiG stated that the Navy worked out a program with the
contractor to permit competitive acquisition of replacement
parts for aircraft engines from their subcontractors using
the prime's technical data. Similar projects were being
favorably recieved by other industrial firms. CRef. 763
In closing, Commodore Piatt observed that the initial
perceived institutional bias against competition may be
dropping from sight. Companies are recognizing that the
"entrenched" sole-source contractors &re not invincible, ^r>d
that competition in government acquisition was, in fact,
good business CRef. 77].
In his "First Year Report for Competition Advocates"
dated 13 August 1984, Commodore Piatt discussed his views on
the competition advocacy program with his troops in the
field.
A major issue in this first "annual report" was the
requirement to "look to the future." Several concepts were
stated. First, competition advocates were directed to pay
particular attention to contractor support services. Next
he addressed the issue that while industry was cooperating
with the competition program, Navy contracting officers
should be prepared to "proceed on their own" if competition
was not forthcoming from industry. Thirdly, the CAG pressed
the advocates to obtain technical data wherever possible to
permit second sourcing.
An aggressive breakout of spare parts to competition was
directed. Due to high visibility by the press, this area
was given added emphasis. Next, early planning for
competition in the acquisition strategy was ordered.
Coupled with this was the direction to encourage maximum
possible subcontractor competition, enlisting the assistance
of the other contract administering activities such as the
NAVPROs and SUPSHIPS.
In summary, Commodore Piatt stated that competition was
here to stay, and that the "powerful market force of
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competition" was bringing about very real and visible
savings CRef. 78D .
F. THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING OCT OF 1384
The Competition in Contracting Pet of 1984, (Division B,
Title VII, of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 [Public Law
98-3693), was a compromise of S. 338, H. R. 5184, and H. R.
£545. It makes amendments to the two primary procurement
directives of the Federal Government, the firmed Services
Procurement Act (ASPA) and the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act (FPASA) . The Act, known as
"Title VII," applies to all solicitations issued after 31
March 1985.
Both the ASPA and FPASA were amended to enhance the
use of competitive procedures to obtain full and open
competition. A major boost in accomplishing this goal was
the elimination of preference for formal advertising, which
places competitive proposals on par with sealed bids. In
fact, Title VII establishes competitive proposals and sealed
bids as the two competitive procedures to be used by Federal
Government CRef. 793.
Sealed bids must be used if four factors are met.
First, sealed bids must be used if time permits the
solicitation, submission, and evaluation of the bids.
Second, sealed bids must be used if the award is made on
the basis of price and other price-related factors.
Third, if it is not necessary to conduct discussions,
sealed bids must be employed. Finally, sealed bids must be
used if there is a reasonable expectation of receiving more
than one bid. If these criteria car\ not be met, competitive
proposals must be requested. CRef. 801!
However, in a major deviation from previous law, Title
VII no longer mandates that the procurement official
document his reasons for choosing competitive proposals over
sealed bids, or vice versa CRef. 813. This makes it quite
difficult for the prospective contractor to contest the
method of solicitation, and requires that the contracting
offical use prudent and subjective judgement in the
selection. The intent of this change to acquisition policy
is to give government procurement personnel much the same
latitude that private industry enjoys in the source-
selection process.
Another change made by Title VII is that the head of a.r>
agency may use competitive procedures, but exclude a
particular source, in order to establish or maintain a.r\
alternative source or sources. This ca.ri be done only if it
will result in maintained or increased levels of competition
and will reduce overall procurement costs. In addition, two
national defense—related stipulations are attached. The
head of the agency may exclude a particular source if it is
in the interest of national defense to have the facility
available in case of national emergency or industrial
mobilization, or if it is in the best interest of national
defense to establish or maintain a.r\ essential engineering,
research, or development capability. CRef. S£D
Title VII allows the head of any agency to limit
competition to small business concerns only, but only if all
firms within the category are allowed to compete. This does
not affect the provisions of Section 8(a) of the Small
Business Act CRef. 83D
.
Sole source procurement is specifically addressed in
Title VII, making such a procurement practice unlawful for
the first time unless one of seven specific exceptions are
met. The seven exceptions are: CRef. 843
Property or services are available from only one source
and no other property or services will satisfy the needs
of the agency.
The agency's need is of such unusual and compelling
urgency that the United States would be seriously
injured unless the agency is permitted to limit the
number of sources. However, maximum competition
practicable must be obtained.
It is necessary to award to a particular source/sources
in order to maintain a facility in case of national
emergency or to achieve industrial mobilization or to
establish or maintain an essential engineering,
research, or development capabiltiy provided by a.r>
educational or other non-profit institution or an FFRDC.
It is required by the terms of an international
agreement or treaty or by written direction of a foreign
government who is reimbursing the agency for the cost of
the procurement.
The statute expressly authorizes or requires procurement
through another agency or from a specified source or the
agency's need is for a brand-name commerical item for
authorized resale.
Disclosure of the agency's needs would compromise
national security unless the number of sources is
limited. Again, maximum praticable competition must be
obtained.
The head of an agency determines it is necessay in the
public interest to use other than competitive procedures
and gives Congress 30 days written notice before award.
This duty is non—delegable.
The use of a sole-source procurement must be justified
in writing, and approved at varying levels on a case-by-case
basis. The validity of the certification will be an issue
in the disputes process, as noted in an article in Contract
Dl^Q3§[!]gQt : CRef. 853
In view of the jurisdictional (and related) effects of
noncert if icat ion or improper certification on contractor
claims under the Contract Disputes Oct, it will be
interesting to see how the courts handle challenges to
sole—source procurements based on lack of or
insufficient certification by contracting officers. If
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit follows its
same course, a sole-source procurement without a proper
certification would be a nullity even if otherwise
properly approved.
Another change brought about by the Act is the reduction
of the uniform threshold for demanding cost or pricing data
from $500, tZuZitZi to $100, 1Z11Z11Z1. In addition, in a fairly vauge
statement, Title VII allows an agency head to "require cost
or pricing data for procurement actions below the
threshold." CRef. 863 This raises the question of whether
the Act authorizes or permits the use of a certification and
contract adjustment provision when the contract or
subcontract is less than $100, 000.
Title VII makes it mandatory for the head of an agency
to: CRef. 87:
Specify agency needs and solict bids/ proposals in a
manner to achieve full and open competition;
Use advance procurement planning and market research:
and
Develop specifications so as to obtain full and open
competition (functional specifications are preferred.)
While not a new concept, this issue emphasizes the
desire of Congress for federal procurement to conform more
to the actions enjoyed by the private sector- By using such
"tools" as market research and advance procurement planning,
government procurement will more efficiently use the private
marketplace.
In amending the OFPP Act, Title VII requires that a.ri
advocate for competition be established in each procuring
activity within the agsricy. This requirement is in addition
to those previously required in each executive agency.
While the basic duties remain the same as on the executive
level, the additional requirement for reporting the
advocate's accomplishments "up the chain" to the agency
level for an annual report to Congress imply that
procurement personnel may be rated for their efforts to
promote competition. While this implication has been
present in acquisition management for several years, it is
further amplified by the language of Title VII. CRef. 883
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G. THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION
While recognizing that competition is not the answer to
all procurement actions, the general approach of DOD is to
compete wherever practical. If the commercial sector is
competing their purchases so extensively, then government
should strive to do likewise.
fill is not well in the competition camp, however.
Recent discussions have centered around the issue of buying-
in and the submission of below—cost bids. Playing "low-
ball" is viewed by many as not ari unsavory practice. In
fact, the General Recount ing Office "expressly regards a
below-cost bid as a boon to the taxpayer. " CRef. 893
Since the defense industry often counts its gains and
losses in the number of contracts awarded each year, the
attainment of a certain number of procurement actions may be
vital to the life of a defense contractor. Historically,
winning the contract has often entailed a "bet-your-company"
strategy, since often the wirmei—takes-all, and lucrative
follow—on contracts h ist orical ly abound in the "out" years.
Costs ca.r\ be recouped in these later contracts, or, if the
company also maintains commercial sales, prices can be
raised in this sector to offset the losses in the defense
work.
The down—stream effect of this action may not be
conducive to the goals of competitive procurement. Once a
contractor has won the bid, at a.r* unreal ist ical ly low price,
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he ca.r\ reasonably assure himself that he is a "sole-source, "
the only supplier of the material. Further along in the
program life he proposes chances, and prices these changes
on a noncompetitive basis, thereby allowing him to recover
his "buy— in" losses. Thus, a low bid and initial cost
savings have resulted in cost growth of the weapon system.
Several solutions have been offered to this dilerna
affecting the competition issue. Among them, the concept of
pursuing "real competition" throughout the life of the
contract appears to have the most merit. Under this
principle, dual or second-sourcing or some form of parallel
development will keep changes to a minimum, with those
changes that do arise being competitivly processed. CRef.
901
Another proposed solution would be for requiring more
emphasis on a.r\ independent cost estimation or audit. While
independent estimation is done under present legislation,
the call is for the use of independent cost estimating teams
at all levels, thus providing a better "before and after"
view of the entire process. CRef. 913
A final, and most radical solution offered, calls for
the formulation of an independent, civilian-run acquisition
system for all of government. This would entail elevating
the status of career acquisition personnel, indepth
training, and the requirement for program managers to be
assigned to a project for a minimum of four years, or ori a
crcj
mi lest one—to—mi lest one basis, to prevent loss of continuity
and accountability. LRef. S£3
The future of the competitive process rests upon the
effectiveness of the programs currently in use. One must
keep in mind, however, as Commodore Piatt has often
observed, that the end goal of competition in defense
acquisition is to reduce costs, improve contractor
performance, and strengthen the industrial base. Most
importantly, this must go hand- in—hand with enhancing the
warfare capability of the United States. CRef. 333
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IV. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Prior to April 1, 1984, there was no single volume
containing all government—wide acquisition regulations.
Three basic regulations, the Defense Acquisition Regulation
(DAR) , the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Procurement Regulation (NASA PR), and the Federal
Procurement Regulation (FPR) formed the basis for all
government procurement guidance.
The intent of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),
is the integration of these three regulations into one
clear, understandable document designed to make it easier
for government employees to procure goods and services and
for contractors to conduct business with the Federal
Government
.
B. PROCUREMENT PRIOR TO THE FAR
In a 197£ report to Congress, the Commission on
Government Procurements proposed the concept of a
government—wide, uniform system of procurement regulations,
which would eliminate the proliferation of regulations
confronting the procurement personnel of the Federal
Government and private industry. This mulititude of "red
tape" was viewed as one of the most pervasive problems
facing the procurment function of government. CRef. 943
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Investigations by the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (DFPP) indicated that, in addition to the three basic
regulations, there were over 874 sets of procurement
regulations totaling over 64,000 pages, many of which were
repetitious, duplicative, and overlapping, causing
considerable confusion CRef. 953. Such a proliferation of
regulations also had the effect of adversely affecting
communications between federal agencies, and greatly
compounded the management of already complex interagency
contracts.
Congress had also seen the necessity for &ri improved,
single set of regulations, and in August of 1974, it enacted
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Public Law 93—
400. One of the principle articles of this act was to
"establish a system of coordinated - and to the extent
feasible - uniform procurement regulations for the executive
agencies. " CRef. 9G1
The drive behind the development of the FAR can best
be described as set forth in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation Questions and Answer paper published by the
Federal Acquisition Insitute of the OFPP in September 1983:
CRef. 973
The FAR, then, was designed to eliminate conflicts,
redundancies and inconsistencies in the existing
regulations; provide users with a single set of
regulations that are well -written and organized
logically; reduce excessive paperwork; and make it
easier to do business with the Federal Government.
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C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAR
Since the FAR was conceived with the goal of making it a
usable document that is simple to understand and use, a
careful, analytical approach was taken to keep what was
already well written, and revise what was unnecessarily
complex and wordy. The language, format, and organization
of the document were to become the major issues of the
development.
The project officially began in January of 1978 when
the Department of Defense and the General Services
Administration agreed, with the assistance of NASA and other
procuring agencies, to take the lead in developing the
regulation. Understandably, this undertaking was of
monumental proportions, required high level support from
every agency involved, and demanded the utmost cooperation
in order to be succesful.
The project was divided into three phases. Phase One,
under the direction of DOD and GSA, established project
offices which drafted and published the initial regulation
for industry and agency review. During Phase Two, industry
and agency comments were reviewed by OFPP, which sent them
to the appropriate drafting office for consideration and
evaluation. The FAR drafting groups then evaluated all
comments and recommendations, recording on a permanent
record their disposition and the rationale behind it. Phase
Three was titled the "Executive Review," in which the three
63
regulatory agencies - DOD, GSA, and NASA - assisted by other
agencies, reviewed the FAR draft to ensure that it was
suitable for operational use in the field.
The FAR became effective on 1 April, 1984, being
published as Chapter 1 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). Customer agencies were afforded the
ability to implement their own FAR supplement, however these
regulations were not to conflict with, restate, or
paraphrase the FAR. They were to conform to its numbering
system, and were also to be published in Title 48 of the
CFR. Since the purpose of the FAR is to reduce the
redundancy and regulatory proliferation in government
guidance, these restrictions also apply to lower level
regulations within agencies as well. In addition, three
measures of control assured that the implementing
regulations would not proliferate. They were: (a)
internal agency management reviews, audits, etc. ; (b) Office
of Management and Budget, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (01 RA) mandatory regulatory review under
Public Law 96-511 (the Paperwork Reduction Act); and, (c)
public review and comment on proposed revisions, as well as
on agency supplementing or implementing regulations.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE FAR
The material in the FAR was organized to promote clarity
and ease of use. To better fit the normal flow of the
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acquisition process, the various topics were arranged in
generally the same order that one would follow in the
preparation of the procurement workpackage.
The FAR is divided into eight subchapters designated by
the letters Pi through H. Each of these subchapters is
further divided into parts, numbered consecutively from 1 to
53. (Numbering does not begin anew with each subchapter,
however. ) The parts are then further broken down into
subparts, sections and subsections. These are further
divided into paragraphs, subparagraphs, and subdivisions.
To accomodate the simplified restructuring of the
regulations, a new numbering system was developed. The
first digit (s) represent the part number, followed by a
decimal point. The numbers after the decimal point
represent the subpart, section, and after a dash, subsection
and any further definition.
To illustrate, part 52, subpart S, section 27,
subsection 1 appears as 52.227— 1. The beauty of this system
lies in the fact that any portion of the FAR can be uniquely
identified and located with a minimum of trouble, a process
that could not be easily done under the previous systems.
1. Content of the FOR
The eight subchapters, their parts and content are
as follows:
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Subchapter A - General
Part 1 - Federal Acquisition Regulation System. The
authority for and method of issuing the FAR, its
applications, administration, deviations, agency regulatory
guidelines, contracting authorities and responsibilities.
Part £ — Definitions of Words and Terms. This part
covers all commonly used terms and words which would require
definition. Specific terminology appliciable to certain
situations are found in their respective parts.
Part 3 - Improper Business Practices and Personal
Conflicts of Interest. Standards of conduct, contracts with
government employees, gratuities, reporting of suspected
unethical practices, and other topics of proper business
behavior are included here.
Part 4 - Administrative Matters. Part 4 covers
documentation of contract actions, contract execution,
contract distribution, procedures for the safeguarding of
classified information, contract reporting, records
retention, and contract file maintenance.
Part 5 — Publicizing Contract Actions. Located here
are the requirements for issuing synopses of proposed
purchases, synopses of contract awards, release of pertinent
information, and procedures for paid advertisements.
Part 6 — Reserved. This part is reserved for future
use.
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Subchapter B - Acquisition Planning
Part 7 - Acquisition Planning. This part lists
those topics which must be considered in developing the
acquisition strategy.
Part 8 — Required Sources of Supplies and Sei
—
vices. Part 8 covers several preference programs of which
the contracting officer needs to be aware. Included s.re
required sources and procedures to follow such as: Federal
Supply Schedule contracts, acquisition of Automatic Data
Processing Equipment (ADPE), utility services, excess
personal property, and the leasing of motor vehicles.
Part 9 - Contractor Qualifications. This part
includes topics relevant to the selection of a responsible
contractor. Such information as contractor team
arrangements, first article testing, debarment and
suspension, organizational conflicts of interest, and
production, research and development pools dure listed.
Part 10 - Specifications, Standards, and Other
Purchase Descriptions. Covered here Are those unique items
peculiar to government acquisition; the specifications and
standards that accompany the purchase document.
Part 11 — Acquisition and Distribution of Commer-
cial Products (ADCOP) . This is a new area that was not
covered in either the DAR or the FPR. It sets forth the
government policy of commercial product procurement and
distr i but ion.
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Part i£ - Contract delivery and performance. fill
aspects of contractor performance e^re covered in this part:
time of delivery, liquidated damages, priorities, variation
in quantity, and stop work orders.
Subchapter C - Contracting Methods and Contract Types
Part 13 — Small Purchase and Other Simplified
Purchase Procedures. This part covers all aspects of
dealing with small purchase, including imprest fund
purchases, charge agreements, and the methods for
sol icitaiton, evaluation, and award of small purchases. In
addition, this part covers a topic brought from the DAR:
Fast Pay.
Part 14 — Formal Advertising. Here will be found
the Uniform Contract Format, and other regulations covering
formal advertising.
Part 15 — Contracting by Negotiation. The general
requirements for negotiated procurement aire listed here.
Namely: authority for negotiation, solicitation procedures,
treatment of unsolicited proposals, competition, source
selection, make-or-buy, price negotiations, protests,
mistakes, and pre—award and post-award contract
mod if icat ions.
Part 16 - Types of Contracts. This part covers the
different types of contracts available to the contracting
officer. Also listed are the various types of pricing
arrangements.
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Part 17 — Special Contracting Methods. Part 17
covers special requirements related to such programs as
multi-year contracting, the use of options, leader-follower
contracting, and contracting for operation of government-
owned or controlled facilities.
Part 18 - Reserved. This part reserved for future
use.
Subchapter D - Socioeconomic Programs
Part 19 - Small Business and Small Disadvantaged
Business Concerns. Covered here are those regulations
concerning small business and small disadvantaged business
previously found in Section I, Part 7 of the DAR and FPR.
Part £8 - Labor Surplus ftrea Concerns. This is also
a relocation from the DAR and FPR, namely from Section I,
Part 8.
Part £1 - Reserved.
Part £2 - Application of Labor Laws to Government
Acquisitions. This part covers the labor laws and national
policies related to labor which impact on acquisition.
Part £3 - Environment, Conservation, and Occupa-
tional Safety. Such topics as pollution control, energy
conservation and hazardous waste are covered in this part.
Part £4 - Protection of Privacy and Freedom of
Information. This part covers the two major statutes in
this area: The Privacy Act and The Freedom of Information
Act.
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Part £5 - Foreign Requisition. Part £5 covers the
Buy American Act and its follow—on, the Trade Agreements
Act. In addition, it covers topics relevant to acquisition
that falls under the International Government Procurement
Code.
Part £& - Reserved.
Subchapter E - General Contracting Requirements
Part £7 - Patents, Data, and Copyrights. Located
here is the discussion of government patent policy,
technical data rights, processing of licenses, assignments
and infringement claims, and policy for and rights involved
in the acquisition of computer software.
Part £8 - Bonds and Insurance. This part includes a
discussion on bonding requirements, the role and
responsibl it ies of sureties, and other topics previously
found in Section X of the DAR and FPR.
Part £9 - Taxes. Also a relocation of the material
found in Section XI of the DAR and FPR. It deals with the
regulations affecting federal excise tax and state and local
taxes.
Part 30 — Cost Accounting Standards. Another
relocation, this one from Section III of the DAR and FPR.
It covers disclosure requirements, contract requirements,
and the administration of Cost Accounting Standards.
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Part 31 - Contract Cost Principles and Procedures.
Uniform cost principles formerly found in Section XV of the
DAR and FPR are covered.
Part 3£ - Contract Financing. This part covers the
financial issues of acquisition management: i.e., advance
payments, progress payments, guaranteed loans, and contract
debts.
Part 33 - Disputes and Appeals. Part 33 includes a
discussion on the legal aspects of the dispute and appeal
process as it applies to the procurement arena.
Subchapter F - Special Categories of Contracting
Part 34 - Major System Acquisition. Included in
this part are those topics relevant to the acquisition of
major systems. Of special interest is the acquisition
strategy involved.
Part 35 - Research and Development Contracting. The
often difficult concepts of this type of contracting are
covered. Special attention is placed in the defining of
requirements and objectives, patent and data rights, and the
goal of R&D contracting efforts.
Part 36 - Construction and Architect-Engineer
Contracts. Covered are the many unique aspects of
construction and architect—engineer contracting.
Part 37 - Service Contracting. This part contains
the many classes of services that were separately listed in
the DAR.
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Part 38 - Federal Supply Schedule Contracting. Con-
tained in this part is a description of the Federal Supply
Schedule program, followed by the procedures and
responsibilities involved in its operation. Several
directives from government agencies have been compiled into
this part of the FAR.
Part 39 - Mangement, Acquisition, and Use of Infor-
mation Resources. Part 39 provides the user with a
practical guide which directs the contracting officer to the
Federal Property Management Regulations for the requirements
of ADPE contracting.
Parts 40 and 41 - Reserved.
Subchapter G — Contract Management
Part 4£ - Contract Administration. The many admini-
strative actions required in contract administration are
combined and listed here. Such actions as post-award
orientation, correspondence and visits, disallowance of
costs, production surveillance, negotiating overhead rates,
pre—award surveys and other relevant topics are covered.
This part implements OFPP Policy Letter 78—4, which directed
inter-agency cooperation in the area of contract
administrat ion.
Part 43 — Contract Modifications. The issuance of
change orders and the negotiation process for supplemental
agreements are covered in this part.
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Part 44 - Subcontracting Policies and Procedures.
This highly debated portion of the FAR covers the review of
contractor purchasing systems and the subcontracting arena.
Part 45 - Government Property. This part combines a
tremendous amount of material that was found throughout the
DftR. Such topics as contactor use and rental of government
property, competitive advantages derived from such use,
management and accounting of government property, and
reporting requirements are covered in one, simple—to—read
area.
Part 46 - Quality Assurance. Part 46 covers all
aspects of the basic quality assurance requirements,
including: inspection and acceptance, material inspection
and receiving reports, warranties, and contractor liabilty
limitations in regard to government property.
Part 47 - Transportation. This part contains policy
relevant to the use of various methods of shipping and
transportation administration. Items such as FOB
origin/destination, government Bills of Lading, contracting
for transportation, and the use of U.S. flag vessels and air
carriers are discussed here.
Part 48 — Value Engineering. This part covers, in
brief format, the information required in the value
engineering clauses.
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Part 49 - Termination of Contracts. Another reloca-
tion part, this one includes the material formerly found in
Section VIII of the DAR and FPR.
Part 50 — Extraordinary Contractual fictions. Part
50 implements Public Law 85-804 into the FAR, which had been
previously located in Section XVII and other areas of the
DAR and FPR.
Part 51 - Use of Government Sources by Contractors.
Contractors use of Government supply sources and interagency
motor pool vehicles are covered in this part.
Subchapter H - Clauses and Forms
Part 5£ - Solicitation Provisions and Contract
Clauses. Possibly the most major structrual change in the
acquisition regulations can be found in this part of the
FAR. This part is divided into three major subparts
covering instructions for use, texts of all provisions and
clauses, and a very useful set of matrices to determine
applicable provisions and clauses to each type of contract
or solicitation.
Part 53 - Forms. A major emphasis of the drafting
groups involved with this part of the FAR was to develop a
set of forms that would be easier to understand and use, and
that would not become outdated as quickly as those forms
used in the past. Numerous forms previously used were
reviewed for content and appl icabi lty, with the result being
a reduction in the number of forms to be used under the FAR.
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This part is divided into three subparts. The first
discusses the newly introduced standard and optional use
forms program. The second prescribes the FAR forms and
directs the reader to the area of the FAR where its usage
is discussed. The third subpart illustrates the forms
prescribed or referenced in the previous subpart. It is
important to note that not all forms mentioned throughout
the FOR Are located in this subpart - only those forms which
are considered to be of general purpose in nature &re
included.
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FOR subpart l.£ describes the FAR maintenance
system. Two councils have been named to jointly maintain
the FAR: the DAR council (DARC), with NASA included, and
the Civil Agency Acquisition council (CAA), chaired by GSA.
The CAA council has 1£ civil agencies included that provide
major procurement missions to the Federal Government.
These councils will solicit comments from all interested
parties and coordinate agreement on the proposed changes to
the regulation. Many view the process of the coordination
function to be one of the weakest areas of the FAR. Since
the function of the councils is to provide a single best
recommendation for a change, the magnitude of the
differences of opinion may stymie the process for an
unreasonable amount of time.
However long it takes to issue a proposed change, the
final recommended revision will be submitted to the FAR
Secretariat at GSA, who will review and implement the change
if found to be acceptable.
3. Su£Bl.ement i.ng the FAR
While the FAR is meant to be a single source of
guidance for acquisition matters, it was recognized by the
drafting committees that agency-specific regulations would
have to be allowed.
In order to keep the system as simple as possible
throughout its applications, agencies can not repeat or
revise material contained in the FAR. The format and
numbering scheme set forth in the FAR Part 1 must be
strictly adhered to. Only those unique, internal
requirements necessary to implement the FAR in each
organization will be allowed in its FAR supplement, and they
will be published in assigned chapters of Chapter 1, Title
48 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Only through strict
compliance with this policy will the proliferation of
regulations and supplements confronting the procurement
personnel be kept to an absolute minimum.
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAR
Both industry and government officials closely monitored
the implementation of the FAR on 1 April 1984, watching for
indications that the transition period might be more
difficult than had been planned.
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Government officials who worked closely with the
development of the FAR passified industry by explaining that
the FAR contained no major policy changes from prior
regulations. However, major transition problems were
expected and found in the civilian government agencies and
those contractors who had dealt almost exclusively with the
Federal Procurement Regulation (FPR) . Those personnel who
had worked with the other regulations found the transition
much easier, requiring "only" getting used to the new format
and semantics of the text. CRef. 983
Early views from government contracting officers were
as expected. Since the FAR contained no new contracting
tools for thern to utilize in the performance of their jobs
and the DAR "milestones" were still present - there was
considerable resistance to change. However, one of the most
troublesome parts of the old systems was finally resolved:
the FAR had an index that was usable by all procuremnt
personne 1
.
Acquisition managers in the non-DOD government areas
encountered considerable problems adjusting to the new
policies and procedures. Such things as getting used to
detailed uniform contract formats, DOD-oriented contract
administration groundrules, and new acquisition planning
policies were major hurdles for previously FPR-oriented
procurement specialists.
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Non-government acquisition managers faced major
administrative problems, mostly concerning training their
contract personnel and answering the multitude of questions
that came from all comers of their business world. Prime
contractors faced the explicit problem of trying to figure





The implementation of the FftR was most implicitly
felt at the subcontractor level, since this group had
historically little expertise in the regulation arena CRef.
993 . ft second problem area was that industry felt that the
government did not understand the problems inherent with
subcontractor relationships, and therefore had done little
in the writing of the FftR to preclude difficulties in this
area. In fact, the industry view was that government felt
this was An area of responsibl ity for the prime contractor,
and not ripe for government intervention. CRef. 100D
2. FftR Solicitations
Another area in which controversy has arisen is in
the treatment of solicitations by the FftR. Ron Smith, a
Purchasing Manager with Grumman Houston Corporation, quotes
NCMft National President Kenneth M. Jackson in the June 1984
issue of Contract Management, the journal of the National
Contract Management Association, on his views of the concept
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of a more flexible procurement process administered by a
highly-skilled workforce: CRef. 1®1U
One of the problems in federal procurement is that the
process is often mechanical instead of judgmental, with
art emphasis on procedure over substance. We seem to be
making the administrative necessities outweigh the
substance. find when people do their jobs by rote, the
system gets into trouble.
Recognizing this limitation in the existing procurement
policies, the drafting committees suggested true reforms in
the solicitation process. The Proposal for a Uniform
Federal Procurement System ("Proposal") issued by DFPP in
February of 198£, promised to provide contracting officers
with a new tool to replace the constraints placed on them by
the then-existing choice of procurement strategies: formal
advertising versus competitive or non-competitive
negotiation. The tool: CRef. 10£D
Two equally valid methods of solicitation will be used
to obtain competition. They equate generally to the
solicitation procedures for Formal Advertising and
competitive negotiation....
Bidding Without Discussion will be used when the
government requirements and the terms and conditions of
the solicitation c^ri be sufficiently described to allow
the timely preparation and evaluation of bids on a
common basis without the need to hold discussions with
bidders. A public bid opening will be held and award
made to the low responsive and responsible bidder.
Bidding With Discussion will be used when it is
necessary to discuss the requirement or terms and
conditions after receipt of bids but prior to contract
award. The bid opening will not be public. Award will
be based on the evaluation factors set forth in the
solicitation.
These proposed reforms gave contracting officers the
opportunity to overcome the problems that had hindered the
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solicitation process for many years. However, they were
faced with massive challenges before they could become
available to the contract managers.
P, prime example of the challenge to be faced was offered
by C. W. Borklund in the February 19S3 Government Executive:
CRef. 1033
Procurement regulations and contracting options are like
a carpenter's box of tools; and the chief challenge to
the acquisition executive is to make the right tool
selections for the job he has to do. That's valid
enough, of course, but where the theory can crumble into
confusion is when higher authority starts second-
guessing that executive's choice of tools.
Mr. Borklund' s observation appears to have come true.
The FPR, as printed, did not make the sweeping reforms
promised in the Proposal. Only one major change was made to
previous regulations, according to Ron Smith: The revision
of the contract award, Formal Advertising Clause <5£. £14—
10) CRef. 1043. The new clause reads "The government may...
accept other than the lowest bid. " Mr. Smith views this
"reform" as a very "fragile and limited" tool to be
available to the contracting officer, but one which must be
capitalized upon in order to become effective: CRef. 1053
Those simple words CThe government may accept other than
the lowest bid3 open an opportunity for awards in the
true best interest of the government. The extent of the
opportunity will be defined in the actions of government
Contracting Officers in the corning months. They may
choose to utilize this new tool to the maximum possible
extent. Or they may choose to do business at the same
old stand.
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3. Contract Administration Under the FQR
ftn often neglected but vital portion of acquisition
management is the performance of the contract administration
function. Contract administrators were elated when Part 4£
of the FOR gave this area such accessibility and visibility,
finally giving it the "teeth" that they felt were required
to protect what they thought were the government's best
interests and to oversee the contract function.
Contract administration requires an organized management
approach which includes adequate procedural guidance,
training, and resources in order to be effective. Of vital
importance to this effectiveness is the requirement that it
must have the total interest and attention of management.
While it was recognized that DOD had implemented most of
these elements in its coverage of contract administration in
the DP.R, other agencies did not share such an interest.
While serving as chairman of the Intel—Agency Contract
Administration Subgroup, Task Group 4, Gunther Lange was
tasked with reviewing the contract administration function
over the entire federal spectrum as a part of implementing
Executive Order 1£35£, Federal Procurement Reforms. He
noticed: CRef. 18611
Besides observing a general lack of rnangement interest
in contract administration by many agencies, we also
found an urgent need for policy and procedural guidance
to the "hands-on" people in the field. As it happens,
most federal agenices don't have a formally structured
contract administration function nor a dedicated
workforce performing it, and as an acquisition function
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it was generally neglected and occasionally treated with
disdain.
Mr. Langes subgroup made several recommendations to
change this view towards contract administration, including
the preparation of several cases for submission to OFPP
which outlined the required changes necessary to bring the
FAR "up to speed.
"
Major issues corning out of FAR Part 42 include:
assignment of contract administration; effective
communication between all players; and negotiating Advance
agreements for independent research and development / bid
and proposal costs.
It is imperative that all personnel concerned with the
contract administration function be aware of the duties and
responsibilities of those parties involved. Not only does
this need to be known for the allocation of manpower
resources, but also for the formulation of long-term
relationships during the life of the contract that 3^re
beneficial to the effective administration of the project.
The Contracting Officer, the Contract Administration
Office, and the contractor must all be aware of each
other's role, function, responsibility, and authority.
The FAR relaxes the restrictive language of the DAR in
this area, giving the Contracting Officer much more latitude
in the delegation of contracts to other offices. The DAR
allowed this action only upon approval by a higher level.
The only exception to this policy is in the delegation of
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contracts to which Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) apply.
These must be delegated for CAS adrnnisi trat ion only. A
final area of interest under Subpart 42.2 is in the
supporting of contract administration of subcontractors by
the contracting office. This subpart reiterates previous
policy that the prime contractor should be responsible for
this area of administrative management.
Subpart 42.4 covers another area in which potential
problems in contact administration ca.n be avoided:
communication. All parties involved in the contract
administration function must have a clear understanding of
"the big picture;" a knowledge of each other's
responsibilities, duties, authority and limitations is
invaluable to the interchange of information required to
keep a contract effective. Under this Subpart, which is
again a compilation of previously published guidance, the
Administrative Contracting Officer is required to be
informed of and monitor all correspondence, and know the
details of plant visits in order to ensure that
"constructive changes" to the contract do not proliferate,
which could eventually cause serious administration problems
if allowed to proceed unchecked.
The final subject of Part 42 that is of interest to this
discussion is that of negotiating advance agreements for
Independent Research and Development (IR&D), and Bid and
83
Proposal (B&P) costs. This area was not covered well
in either the DAR or the FPR.
Under Subpart 42. 10, any contractor receiving payment in
excess of $4 million in a fiscal year from any government
agency for I R&D and B&P costs is required to negotiate an
advance agreement with the Government that will set a
ceiling for allowing I R&D and B&P costs for the following
fiscal year. Of further interest is the fact that if an
agreement can not be reached, the contracting officer is
authorized to make a unilateral determination of the amount
to be paid for IR&D/B&P costs. fin appeal may be made for
such a determination, but it must be made separate and
distinct from board or court appeals under the Contract
Disputes Act of 1978.
F. THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT OF 1984
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (Division B,
Title VII, of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 [Public Law
98-3693), herein called "Title VII", applies to all
solicitations issued after 31 March 1985. Several issues in
this Act affect the procedures as set forth in the FAR.
The first issue to be discussed is the change to
Competitive Procedures. In response to the promises of OFPP
in the 198£ Proposal, Title VII establishes two competitive
procedures: "sealed bids" and "competitive proposals."
Sealed bids must be used if time permits the solicitation
and evaluation process to be completed. Award is on the
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basis of price arid other price-related factors, if it is not
necessary to conduct discussions, and, if there is a
reasonable expectation of receiving more than one sealed
bid. Any deviation from these points requires that
competitive proposals be requested.
The bottom line of this policy change is to give
government procurement personnel much the same latitude as
individuals in the private sector in choosing a source-
selection method. Hopefully, this will result in a more
efficient procurement action, but it will also require
effective use of subjective judgment on behalf of the
contracting officer, who will not be required to document
his or her exercise of discretion in choosing the
procurement procedure.
ft second issue is the requirement in Title VII for
federal agencies to utilize advanced procurement planning
and market research to achieve full and open competition
through the use of proper specifications and timely
solicitations. This provision, while not new to procurement
policy, emphasizes the importance of bringing federal
procurement policy into closer conformity with the private
sector where such practices have proven to be effective.
The drafting of specifications is addressed to emphasize
their importance to full and open competition. Title VII
mandates that specifications should be written in terms of
function, performance, or design requirements. fts with the
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previous issue, this is not new to the acquisition arena,
but has been emphasized to ensure enhanced attention is
given to the subject.
A major change brought about by Title VII is the
reduction of the uniform threshold for submission of cost or
pricing data from $500,080 to $100,000. While significant,
it does not provide definitions of the terms "cost data" or
"pricing data" and provides no guidance for use of either.
In addition, the statute does not address whether
authorization is granted for the contracting officer to use
a certification and contract adjustment provision when the
contract or subcontract action is less than $100,000. It
merely states that the contracting officer may request it.
Another area of change is in the small purchase
environment, where Title VII raises the ceiling on small
purchase by civilain agencies to $£5,000. While the FAR
contained provisions for special procedures relating to
small purchase actions, Title VII appears to direct its
comments toward the civil branch of federal procurement.
In addition to the areas discussed above, Title VII made
several other sweeping changes to federal acquisition
management. However, since this chapter is primarily a
discussion of the FAR and its implications to federal
procurement, further review of Title VII will be found
elsewhere in this paper.
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G. THE FUTURE OF THE FAR
The issuance of the FOR has provided a starting point
for greater uniformity in procurement regulations. The
success of this major endeavor, however, rests in the
implementing agencies and their strict adherence to the
policies set forth.
While most federal agencies &)re still "getting
aquainted" with the new regulation, it is evident that the
simplified nature of the FOR and its "user-friendliness"
have won—over many an acquisition manager and procurement
specialist alike. "Down-range" impact of the document will
depend to a great extent upon the feedback that these people
will provide OFPP, and the suggestions offered to keep the
regulation current with accepted acquisition practices.
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V« IHE WEAPON SYSJEM WARRANTY
A. INTRODUCTION
Section 794 of the Fiscal Year 1984 Department of
Defense Appropriations Act requires that written guarantees
be obtained in connection with the procurement of weapon
systems. The section provides that before DOD can obligate
or spend appropriated funds for the procurement of a weapon
system, the contractor must warrant that the system and its
components are designed and manufactured to conform to
performance requirements, and are free from all defects in
materials and workmanship that could affect performance.
This statutory guarantee requirement produced dramatic
and complex changes in the acquisition of weapon systems,
their subsystems, and components. Current legislative
action continues to bring attention to this issue, as C3.ri be
seen by the 1985 Defense Appropriations Pet.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUARANTEE ISSUE
A desire for product reliability has always been in the
forefront of consumer thoughts. People simply want an item
that they paid money for to work as designed! While this
issue has surfaced numerous times in the private consumer
arena, it was not until the middle 1970s that the Federal




Rising weapon system costs and decreased reliability
were significant issues facing Government program managers
during this period. ft strong, albeit uninformed voice from
the constituents "back home" urged congressional action when
increased tax expenditures were being spent on repair of
expensive Defense Department material and equipment. The
average taxpayer could not comprehend why a million dollar
irsid3.)r set was not provided with a guarantee to "work as
intended or be replaced" by the supplier, when almost any
household article, regardless of purchase price, was backed
by some form of consumer protection plan. The bottom line
was that Government would reduce the cost of defense and
increase efficiency by implementing warranty requirements
that would ensure equipment would be better made and
maintained. Hence, the cost of procurement would be less and
life cycle costs would be lower. Thus, the leading issue in
the campaign towards Government warranty legislation became
to foster reliability and provide a method to indemnify the
consumer.
The ftir Force implemented expanded use of warranties
under DftR Section 1-3S4 in 1378 when General ft. D. Slay,
Commander of the ftir Force Systems Command, ordered
application of guarantee clauses to procurement programs
such as the ftir-Launched Cruise Missile and ftdvanced Medium
Range ftir-To-ftir Missile CRef. 1873. This and other
Government programs provided the impetus for the development
as
of the flir Force Product Performance Agreement Guide (PPftG),
a joint venture of Government and industry, and for the
establishment of the Product Performance Agreement Center at
Wright—Patterson flir Force Base, Dayton Ohio. Private
industry input to these projects was significant, providing
valuable information both to the PPftG and to the Center from
a source that had extensive expertise in the subject.
The ftrrny published PR 702-13 in January of 1981. This
regulation set forth the policies for the ftrrny warranty
program, but met with little support in the field.
Implementation and administration of the directive was left
almost entirely with the local commander, resulting in
widespread differences in the effectiveness and emphasis of
the regulation. CRef. 1083
Aside from the ambitious ftir Force program, the state of
warranty guidance was dismal at best in the rest of DOD.
Field contracting activities complained that warranty
provisions were inadequate and overlooked an important
source of improvement in the federal acquisition process.
Due to this pressure, the DfiR Council reviewed the area in
their evaluation of the material to be included in the
FftR. CRef. 1091
The initial draft of the FftR showed little change in the
wording of the warranty clause, but did provide guidance for
contracting personnel about employing a warranty, and for
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command designation of a warranty control team to administer
warranties and warranty claims.
The real drive behind warranty reform came from Senator
Mark Andrews in his amendment to the Fiscal Year 1984
Department of Defense Appropriation Act, H. R. 4185. This
legislation, provided in draft form to industry for comment
in mid- 1983, was written with &r\ intent to create a
commercial marketplace environment out of the DOD
acquisition process. Industry replies were often strongly
worded, indicating that the proposed legislation would only
widen the rift between Government and the private sector,
and that it was "hopelessly out of phase with economic
real ity. .. and common sense." CRef. 1103
Nevertheless, industry objections quickly died away when
the press, still glowing over their "scoop" on spare part
price fleecing by industry, indicated an interest in further
tarnishing the private sector by pursuing the warranty issue
on the front page.
Given this reprise, Senator Andrews took the opportunity
to further push the proposed legislation, succesfully
defending his case before the Senate Appropriations
Committee and on the Senate floor. By late 1983
congressional support clearly backed the new warranty
legislation, and on 8 December the bill was implemented into
law.
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C. THE WARRANTY PROVISIONS
The Fiscal Year 1984 Defense Appropriations Act, as
implemented by the 14 March 1984 DOD Guarantee Policy
Guidance, requires all DOD fixed-price type production prime
contractors for weapon systems to provide a guarantee
provision CRef. 1113.
The guarantee must be one of two mandated types. The
first, a conformance to performance requirement warranty,
requires that if a test or demonstration is required by the
contract, a failure to pass this evaluation will result in
the contractor taking all required action necessary to
conform the item to contract specifications. All costs
incurred during this performance would be born by the
contractor. A second implication of this type of warranty
is that if a performance requirement details an operation of
the system for a specified period of time, and the system
fails during this performance period, the same contractor
efforts 3ire required to bring the item into conformance.
The second type of guarantee required by the Act is that
at the time of delivery to the Government, the contractor
warrants the weapon system and each significant component of
it to be free from defects in material and workmanship that
may cause the system to fail the specified Government
performance objectives.
In both of these types of warranties, the contractor is
obligated to reimburse the Government for any costs incurred
92
by the Government in procuring such parts from another
source or making the necessary repairs, if the contractor
does not take prompt action to achieve the specified
performance requirements himself. The ftct specifically
states that the Government may claim expenses caused by
defects in material and / or workmanship, but is silent
about claiming reimbursement for administrative costs. It
can be perceived, however, that since the Government can
claim "costs incurred. . . and the cost of making or procuring
necessary repairs," CRef. llE'D administrative costs are
included.
fin important issue raised in the ftct is that of
contractor liability in regard to Government Furnished
Property (GFP) and Government Furnished Material (GFM)
.
Section 794 (b) states: CRef. 1133
ft written guarantee. .. shal 1 not apply in the case of any
weapon system or component thereof which has been
furnished by the Government to a contractor.
Serious implications accompany this issue when there
exists a mixture of contractor and Government material in a
weapon system. It is probable that entire weapon systems
may be held up in trial and evaluation when a dispute arises
over the extent of coverage by a contractor for such a
hybrid system. The Government has the legal authority to
force the contractor into completing work on the system and
bring it into conformance to the performance specifications.
However, a long and costly court battle may ensue that could
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have been avoided had both parties carefully negotiated the
issue and declared the extent of coverage pertaining to the
hybrid system.
Section 794 (c) states another issue of the Act . The
Secretary of Defense may waive the warranty requirement if
he determines that it is "in the interest of the national
defense or would not be cost effective." CRef. 1143 It
further states the the Secretary must notify the Comrnitees
on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in writing of his intention to
waive the requirement.
D. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE
While some of the "troops in the trenches" were asking
for stronger language in a warranty clause, the hierarchy of
DOD was not prepared to so quickly implement the
legislat ion.
Prior to the signing of the law, representatives of
industry met with officials from DOD to discuss the
implications of the proposed legislation. Many concerns
were voiced, with the primary impediments being definition
of terms, insurance ramifications, and the effect of the new
law on the spare parts breakout program.
As a result of these meetings and further discussion
within DOD, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer on 16
December 1983 issued a 9® day blanket waiver of the
requirement to all DOD CRef. 1153. It was hoped that this
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extension would give the department time to resolve the
difficulties it was having with the legislation, and provide
an implementation that would have minimal disruption.
Concurently with this waiver, a "Notice of Draft
Guidance on Written Guarantees" was developed and
subsequently published in the Federal Register on £0 January
1984. This notice requested that comments on the guarantee
issue be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
within 30 days. CRef. ll&J
The notice created a furor from both the sponsor of the
original legislation, Senator Andrews, and from industry as
well. Senator Andrews listened to the position of OSD and
did acquiesce on some issues, however he was adamant on the
issue that the warranty provision not be regarded as a.r\
"either or" proposition. The Secretary of Defense was
provided with an ability under the initial legislation to
waive a warranty requirement where it would not be cost
effective. However, Senator Andrews replied: CRef. 117!]
The language clearly states that no funds will be
appropriated by this or any other act to build a weapon
system unless the prime contractor or contractors
provide the Government with a written guarantee. This
is now the law enforcing the warranty provision.
Comment to the draft was divided, with the majority of
the input coming from large defense prime contractors, small
businesses, and special interest lobby groups. The positive
comments centered around the reliability and enhanced
performance implications of the warranty legislation, in
addition to the view that warranties were commonplace in the
civil marketplace and that Government should take advantage
of this proven program.
Negative replies covered the realm from small business
to large industry, with most of the comments directed to the
financial implications.
Small Business stated that they could not assume the
risk of the initial warranty costs, and that tooling
maintanence after component delivery could cause financial
distress. It was widely felt that enforcement of the
warranty would drastically increase contract administration
costs, and that a proliferation of disputes and lengthy
litigations may evolve. In the design areas, most
contractors felt that it was improper to force a contractor
to guarantee a directed design, and that mandated warranties
inhibited innovative technology.
OSD considered these comments, and described what it
felt were the major issues. Harvey Gordon, Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(Acquisition Management), aired these views in an address to
the National Contract Management Association Regional
Symposium, 10 February 1984 at Sacramento, California CRef.
118:.
Mr. Gordon agreed with a majority of industry that the
language of the legislation was imprecise and required
further definition. Several issues were viewed as being
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"incorrect presumptions which underlie the legislation." On
example of this was given in the implicit prohibition of
concurrent production with development of a weapon system.
In aircraft construction, it is common to award production
follow—on contracts prior to operational test and
evaluation, thus preserving the continuity of the
production process.
The issue of warranting a directed design by a second
source manufacturer was raised, voicing the opinion that
this was highly difficult for the contractor to efficiently
accomplish. Industry was highly polarized on this issue, and
Mr. Gordon agreed with them. Forcing a contractor to
guarantee a piece of equipment for which he had no direct
design involvment was seen to be akin to making an assembler
of electronic devices warrant that the supplied components,
all of unknown origin and reliability, would perform to a
certain specification. One cs.rt not guarantee what one does
not know
!
Pillowing a contractor to configure his production to a
performance requirement rather than dictating the method of
production was another issue raised by Mr. Gordon. It was
felt that in allowing this, the contractor would be relieved
of all legal liability to maintain a baseline configuration,
and he would have the unilateral right to change the design
to conform to his production requirements. OSD felt that
this would severly restrict interchangeabi 1 ity in
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equipments, and would adversly affect the spare parts
support programs.
This brought another implication to light, that of the
difference between the commercial and defense marketplace.
While the commercial arena has total control over the design
and configuration process of their own projects, and can
thus provide their own operating and maintanence schedules,
such an environment does not extend to the military market.
Administrative costs were viewed by Mr. Gordon as being
enormous. Deployed maintenance, contractor contract
execution procedures, and general administrative costs
would pose a detriment to the effectiveness of the program.
ft similar administrative complication seen by OSD was in
the magnitude of the number of separate warranties that
could be involved in a single project. Mr. Gordon cited the
B-l bomber as &ri example: With over 19,000 separate
contractors providing time and material to the aircraft
system, managing art equal number of different warranty
programs would be highly taxing and extremely expensive.
ft final objection raised by Mr. Gordon was the fall icy
that enforced warranty legislation would enhance the quality
and effect ivness of a weapon system. OSD felt that such
regulation only served to further limit the legal liability
of the contractor, rather than expand it.
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The overall thrust of the Gordon address was to convey
DOD desire for the repeal of the law, or to have it reworded
to better fit the concerns of the military CRef. 1193.
This address by Mr. Gordon was warmly received by the
commercial sector, but little mention of it made the news.
Repercussions on the issue came soon, however, with the
apparently contradictory statements of Secretary Weinberger
before the Senate Budget Cornmitte and Senator Andrews on 6
February. Weinberger assured them he was doing everything
possible to ensure the legislation would work in the DOD.
This statement had to be withdrawn in short order, when
pressure from the press and members of Congress forced
Secretary Weinberger to admit that DOD was not totaly
infatuated with the legislation CRef. 1£iZiD.
The net effect of the dismay shown by DOD prompted a
Senate firmed Services Committee investigation into the
provisions in late February, resulting in the realization
that there had been inadequate hearings held before the
enactment of the legislation, and that, in fact, complex
issues remained to be resolved. Further hearings were
directed.
On 14 March 1984 the final formal DOD guidance regarding
the implementation of the warranty provision was issued.
While not containing any unexpected material, it did prompt
the ordering of a GAO review to determine compliance with
the original legislation.
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The result of this investigation, issued or\ £4 ftpril
1984, helped the DOD effort by stating that it found
significant imprecision in the language of the law, and that
overall, the guidance clause issued by DOD was consistent
with the requirements of the original legislation CRef.
l£i:.
1. Einal. Policy. Guidance
The final Guidance Memorandum issued by DOD made
several notable changes to the draft Guidance Memorandum.
Three major areas are addressed: the waiver of the
application of the guarantee provision to all cost
reimbursement type contracts; a refinement of the definition
of a weapon system; and the authorization for contracting
officers to use greater discretion in tailoring the
guarantee to particular components of a weapon system.
Deputy Defense Secretary William H. Taft IV stated that
the waiver of cost reimbursement type contracts was made due
to the decision by DOD that such a warranty action would not
be cost effective, and therefore under Section 794
subsection <c), notice was given in the final Policy
Guidance to Congress and the House that such a waiver was
granted CRef. 1£2D.
Critical changes were found in the definitions of
certain items in the final Guidance. Under "weapon system"
the inclusion of software, ordnance, and related support
equipment was notably absent. Also not attached to this
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term are such items as "small arms, torpedos, bombs, and
artillery. " However, it must be noted that any or all of
these items ca.ri be included under a warranty provision if a
determination is made that the inclusion is necessary to
create ^n effective guarantee for the entire weapon system.
Another term, found especially troublesome by industry,
was "component." The final Guidance appeared to narrow the
definition somewhat, but the language was seen as being
unclear and slightly ambiguous. Basically, it defines a
"component" as any assemblage "that is treated as a
significant element of the weapon system." CRef. 1233 The
latter phrase was added in the final Memorandum, and was
seen by industry as DODs' way of saying that the guarantee
should "not be applied to the nuts and bolts level." CRef.
1243 It was observed that the language would compel weapon
system contractors to "flow down" to all subcontractor and
vendor levels guarantees paralleling those requried by the
Get.
The third issue of the final Guidance Memorandum,
tailoring the guarantee to particular components or areas of
a weapon system, is important in that it separates the
research and development phase from production. Paragraph 1
(c) of the Memorandum expressly excludes from the guarantee
requirements any contract in which the "prinicple purpose
...is research and development." CRef. 1S53 However, it
HZil
goes on to provide for partial guarantee coverage where a
contract entails both RTD&E and production.
As an aid to the contracting office, the final Guidance
provides a "model clause" to be used in fixed-price-
type contracts. This does not exclude the writing of
"custom" guarantee clauses however, as the memorandum
explicitly states that, "where different types of
requirements BLY^e present, tailored guarantee clauses may be
written. " CRef. 1£6D
As a final issue, Secretary Taft authorized the
delegation of waiver authority to the service secretaries
and defense agency directors, noting that they may delegate
it further "to appropriate levels of command."
To elaborate, he stated: CRef. 1273
With due regard for the cortcet^ri noted by the Congress
and with appreciation for the need of continuing high
level management attention, rede legation of this
authority should be made only to appropriate levels of
command.
With the high degree of Congressional interest and the
level of visibility given to the issue by the media, this
inclusion was wise in light of the historic reluctance by
contracting officals to implement warranty provisions.
Delegation of waiver authority too far down the chain of
command would be detrimental to the intent of the Pet.
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E. THE FISCAL YEAR 1985 DEFENSE AUTHORI ZATION ACT
Effective 1 October 1984, the Fiscal Year 1985 Defense
Authorization Act approved some new warranty language and
regulat ions.
Three major areas of change are found in the Act
pertaining to weapon system warranties. As reported by the
Senate Armed Services Committee, concern was voiced over the
language and provisions of the 1984 Act, Section 794. It
was the view of the Committee that an adverse impact on the
ability of small business to compete for defense contracts
was brought about by 794. In addition, "great concern" was
viewed over the insistence upon performance guarantees for
the initial production of a new weapons system under the
provisions of 794. Finally, the Committee recognized that a
contractor for DOD rtes/ef controls all aspects of the design
of a weapon system, and therefore under 794 may have been
subjected to unreasonable liability for certain performance
requirements. CRef. 1£83
The new Act begins by redefining several fundamental
terms. A "weapon system," or "other defense equipment" is
now defined as Art item or items that ca.n be used directly by
the armed forces to carry out combat missions. In addition,
only systems which cost more than $100, 81Z11Z1, or for which the
eventual total procurement cost is more than $10 million,
are covered. The inclusion of "other defense equipment" is
nzi;
intended to enlarge the types of equipment covered by
warranties as compared to those covered by 794.
Missing from the 1985 Act are the provisions of section
794 that dealt with "other contractors" and components of
systems. The Senate Committee noted that the "traditional"
method of having the prime contractor obtain appropriate
warranties from subcontractors is workable and should be
followed by the Government.
To enforce the mandate for contractors to build to
specifications, the new Oct requires conformity with design
and manufacturing requirements, as well as guarantees on
essential performance requirements. This allows for the
designation of certain performance requirements to be non-
essential, therefore relieving the contractor from the
potentially costly burden of warranting a non-essential
element of the system. CRef. 1£91
The issue over contractors taking prompt action to
correct failures has also been readdressed in the new
legislation. The language has been reworded to reflect in
all situations where the contractor is prepared to promptly
remedy the breach of guarantee, he should be allowed to do
so. The key word in this issue is "promptly. " The speed
with which the contractor cart remedy the situation will
depend to a great extent upon the physical location and
condition of the equipment involved. The Government is
placed in the position to determine what a reasonable length
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of time should be, and what constitutes a contractors
reasonable effort to promptly correct the deficiency. The
scope of the contractors efforts has been expanded over the
wording in 794, and is now stated to reflect that the
contractor should take "any and all types of action
necessary to correct any breach of the guarantees offered.
"
CRef. 1303
The issue of waivers and the required notification of
legislative bodies of intent to grant waivers has also been
modified under the 1985 Act. While the Secretary is still
required to notify in a timely manner both the Senate and
the House, the language now reads that this action is
required only for "major defense acquisition programs," and
that notification on minor programs may be "aggregated ar\ti
transmitted to the committees annually, not later than
February 1 for the prior calendar year. " CRef. 1313
One of the most widely debated portions of the new Act
was the issue regarding the deletion of the requirement for
performance guarantees on the initial production of a new
weapon system. The guarantee of a "mature full scale
production" system is the bottom line of any warranty
program, and to best achieve this both parties should have a
full understanding of the capabilities of the system. By
allowing for initial production without the statutary
guarantee attached, both the contractor and the government
will have a better picture of what the system will be
1135
capable of doing. By reducing the risk ori the contractor
during the volatile first stages of production, the
contractors proposal for full-scale production will be more
accurate, and the proposal for a performance guarantee
should be much more reasonable. CRef. 13£3
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The objectives of this research effort were to study and
analyze some of the recent events that have significantly
shaped federal procurement actions during 1984. In doing
so, the author has discussed current acquisition policy,
competition, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the
weapon system warranty.
B. CONCLUSIONS
From the issues discussed in this paper, the following
conclusions have been reached.
1. The BESMi§i.ti2El E'ESS^ss
All of the DOD components have identified the
process by which acquisition will occur under their
jurisdiction, and have issued in-depth guidance on the
procedures to be used. However, the simplified procurement
process mandated by OFPP and manifested in the Federal
Acquisition Regulations does not appear to have been totally
realised. A proliferation of directives exists in the
services regarding the acquisition process, however very
little is dedicated to one major issue: acquisition
strategy. Without a viable acquisition strategy, it is
highly unlikely that program stability can be achieved.
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It is widely believed that program stability is one of
the keys to holding down cost growth. Without support from
the highest levels of management in the stabilization of
funding levels and production rates, program turbulence will
occur. Equally likely will be the occurance of cost growth
from lower levels of management through the allowance of
uncontrolled design and schedule changes.
The Defense Acquisition Improvement Program has done
much to increase the efficiency of federal procurement.
Increased awareness of duties and emphasis on planning and
effective program management have given federal procurement
personnel the guidance they require to perform their jobs
more effectively. Continued emphasis on the improvement of
the acquisition process by all levels of Government is to be
expected.
£• Qsmget i.t_ion J.n 9£9Jyi.si.tion
Competition has been long favored as the single
best method for reducing costs in acquisition. Including
the competition issue early in the development of the
acquisition strategy is vital to successful program
execution and efficient management. The issue, though,
while being "pushed" in every conceivable manner by top
federal management, is meeting significant problems in
achieving its goal of cost reduction.
Commercial industry is committed to survival, pure and
simple. To become a "sole source" in a lucrative government
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program is one way of ensuring future solvency. Practices
such as "buying- in" and "undercost ing " a.re commonly found in
government contracting, and have on occasion been welcomed
by federal management. A very real propensity for cost
growth exists in this environment, and must be closely
monitored to ensure adequate attention is being applied to
prevent rampant program cost escalation.
Federal acquisition has methods to combat the buy— in
problem, but poor enforcement of the methods and
inconsistencies in guidance have left the tax-paying public
and federal leadership alike criticizing the process.
Competition, in all cases, is not "free. " When directed
by higher authority, mandatory competition, such as the
development of second sources, cs.ri and does cost money.
While the long-range benefits may often outweigh the
inflated price paid for the material, this may not always
be the case. Close attention must be applied to this area
to ensure that proper benefit is being derived from
cornpet it ion.
3. It>g Egdera.1 Qcguisji tjion Regulation
Rarely in the history of federal procurement has &ri
issue caused as much discussion and debate as the
introduction of the FAR. After a gestation period of five
years, the FAR became law amid questioning procurement
personnel in industry and Government alike.
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The major issue of conversation regarding the FAR has
centered around simplicity: has it in fact achieved the
objective of simplifying the previously complex acquisition
regulatory system?
Procurement personnel familiar with the intricacies of
the DAR found the FAR to be a breath of fresh air: finally
there exists a regulation that is relatively easy to read,
readily accessible, and won't break the back of a bookshelf.
Their counterparts in industry and some of the civilain
agencies, however, who were not intimate with the mechanics
of the government procurement system, or who worked only
with the FPR, found the going a bit tougher.
While being greatly simplified by the FAR, the
complexities of the previous system are viewed by many as
returning in the form of individual agency supplements.
Agency heads are authorized to approve deviations deemed
necessary to meet the unique requirements of the local
command, and as such there exists a great propensity for
proliferation to once again strike the regulation arena. A
very real potential for further confusion exists when one
considers that while the supplements can not materially be
inconsistent with the FAR, there is nothing to prevent them
from being inconsistent with each other.
Legal implications have risen from the simplistic nature
of the language in the FAR. While the intent of the rewrite
was to clairify the issues, legal precedent has apparently
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changed since lawyers argue that different words have
different meanings. Thus, even though no substantive change
was intended, the editing process has introduced a.ri
impediment to the acquisition cycle, as legal precedent will
be challenged, and lengthy court battles will have to be
endured.
4. Ihe Weapon System Warranty
Responding to the rising costs of repair for faulty
design and manufacture in weapon systems, Congress
introduced a "Pandora's Box" in the form of the warranty
issue. The complexity of the issue as well as the cost were
both highly underestimated, and the initial drafting of the
legislation was poorly done.
As occurs in any expedition into unexplored territory,
not fully preparing for the trip can often prove to be
fatal. In the case of the warranty issue, fatality has been
narrowly avoided only by the introduction of the Fiscal Year
1985 Defense Authorization Oct which has corrected many of
the deficiencies of the orginial legislation. Numerous
issues, including the effect upon small business,
concurrency, initial language, and the no-fault liability in
directed design were revised in the new legislation.
The "uncharted waters" of the warranty issue also
presented the problem of having no historical base to
substantiate legal and administrative issues. Had proper
planning gone into the foundation of the warranty issue, the
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resultant reception by the acquisition managers may not have
been so adversarial. Legal precedence should have been more
clearly stated in the initial legislation, thereby
transmitting the true intent of Congress to the program
managers. As it was, the intent of Congress was not clear,
and the hasty implementation of the issue spawned discontent
on the part of some acquisition managers who were faced with
what they perceived to be Siri ill-conceived mandate.
The risk inherent to warranties has become one of the
major issues of debate. The buyer shoulders the cost risk
in the price of the contract for inadequate product
performance. The seller bears the risk that the cost of
correcting inadequate performance will exceed the priced
amount of the contract. Hence, the desire of Government is
to force industry to discipline the design and manufacturing
processes which results in compliance with performance
specif icaitons, and "better bang for the buck."
It is obvious that a greater data base on the
implications of the warranty legislation is required to
fully derive the maximum benefit from such performance
guarantees. Continued emphasis in this area and compilation
of information will ensure that warranties are commensurate
with the expense and are suited to the unique requirements
of weapon system acquisition.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the discussions addressed in this paper, the
following recommendations 3.t^e made.
1 . The Acgui.s i.t ion Process
A great degree of initiative is required of all
personnel involved with the acquisition process. The
program manager must have the ability to surface good ideas
that will save both time and money, and must have the
foresight to do so in a timely manner.
Program stability must be achieved to prevent
uncontrollable cost growth. Continued planning for
competition assists in this area, and the potential benefits
of mult i -year procurement should not be overlooked.
The Defense Acquisition Improvement Program has a
significant amount of momentum going into 1985. Only through
dedicated emphasis by program managers and key staff
personnel will this momentum endure. Improved planning and
aggressive decision making is required in all areas of
management. The development and execution of a viable
acquisition strategy is mandatory for successful program
operat ion.
£. Qompet_iti.on J_n Acguis.it ion
For a program to be successfully competed,
acquisition managers need to be aware of the indications and
implications of buying-in. In-depth financial analysis, a
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thorough knowledge of accounting procedures, and attention to
detail are all required on the part of the contracting
community to curb this costly practice.
Numerous methods of cost estimation have been proposed
and used by contracting officers to determine "should-cost s"
and other pricing guides. This practice should be
standardized as much as possible, and audited on a "before
and after" basis.
When follow-on competition is feasible, it is possible
to allow a "buy— in" to win the initial award, followed by
an aggressive development of a second souce, or "full"
follow—on competition. The "low—ball" benefits are then
reaped from the initial contract, but the contractors "get
well" award is avoided.
3. The Federal. AcguisitjLgn Re^uJLat jLgn
The primary action required of federal acquisition
managers to ensure success of the FAR is to insure that the
agency supplements are constructed to enahance, not hide,
the intent of the Regulation. Proliferation on behalf of
the agency supplements will weaken the useful lness of the
FAR, making it a more complex and unmanageable document than
the one it was designed to replace.
The courts will have to iron out the intricacies of the
language changes. Federal acquisition managers and industry
officials will need to devote more time and effort to
understanding the regulations binding their contracts. No
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assumptions cart be made in this area; it is vital that both
sides of the table know what the contract really says under
the FAR.
4. The Weapon System Warranty
To prevent repeating the mistakes of the past, DOD
acquisition managers will need to closely monitor the
implementation of the new warranty legislation and insure
that Congress is aware of any potential problems. There
exists a possibility for cost savings under a viable
warranty program. However, DOD must put aside the
advisarial attitude and work with legislators to enact
enforceable warranty policies to achieve this goal.
Likewise, both Government and industry contracting personnel
will need to expend significant effort to ensure that they
fully understand the implications of the legislation.
Training in the intricacies of the warranty issue is vital
to all, as is a requirement to look to the future for




SYNOPSIS OF CURRENT ACQUISITION TOPICS
A. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
1. Discussion
The acquisition process underwent some modification
during the late months of 1983 and on into 1984. The
"Carlucci Initiatives" were well entrenched in the
procurement community, and great effort was being expended
to reform the acquisition process.
2. The Thayer initiatives
On 12 January 1983 Paul Thayer became Deputy
Secretary of Defense, inheriting the Acquisition Improvement
Program (AIP) and the 32 "Carlucci Initiatives." Thayer
issued a "Second Year—End Report" on 8 June 1983, under
the cover of a memorandum titled Guidance on the Acguisition
I_mgroyement Pro.gr_a.rn.
_£AiP)_. Contained within the report was
a summary of progress made during the first two years of the
AIP, and an observation that 13 of the initiatives had been
fully implemented, nine were in various stages of progress,
and the remainder required further action to be taken.
Mr. Thayer consolidated twelve of the remaining issues
into six areas of concentration: program stability,
multi-year procurement, stability in production rates,
realistic budgeting, improved readiness and support, and the
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encouragement of competition. These were the areas that
"offer both the greatest management challenges and the
highest potential payoff" according to Secretary Thayer
CRef. 13.
3. BIEIs I£>ir.d_ Year
William H. Taft IV replaced Thayer in early 1984.
Soon after taking office, he released the "Third Annual
Report" on the RIP. Noting that considerable progress had
been achieved over the previous three years, he also voiced
cortcerri that "priority management attention" must be
continued so that the momentum would not be lost CRef. 'Ell.
Citing the six initiatives of Thayer as still being vital to
the ftIP, Taft added a seventh: the enhancement of
industrial base response. This was in reaction to concern
over the nation's defense industrial capability to meet
surge production needs in the event of an emergency. Taft
also discussed program stability, stating that it was vital
to the accomplishment of effective program management CRef.
31.
Solutions to the acquisition problems were offered in
the report, starting with the basic decision process of DOD.
Aggressive decisions regarding vertical cuts, new starts,
and long-range planning on behalf of DOD would be required
to achieve greater program stability. The exploration of a
two—year budget process was voiced, as was the reviewing of
the Milestone II definition as set by DODD 50130.1.
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Acquisition strategy was also under review during 1984.
Fort Bel voir Virginia was the site of a two—day workshop
held in May 1984 that addressed acquisition strategy from
the perspective of the tri-services and the private sector.
The workshop recognized that the acquisition strategy was a
key issue in the program evolution cycle, and that planning
the strategy early-on in the procurement process was
mandatory to effective management. Lack of simple guidance
for program managers was cited by the workshop as being a
major hindrance to achieving this goal. The workshop noted
that the Defense Systems Management College was in the
process of compiling the Qcguisi.ti.on Strategy Q>y.ide, and
hoped that this publication would fill the void CRef. 43
.
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B. COMPETITION IN ACQUISITION
1. Di_scussi_on
Competition received widespread attention during
1984. President Reagan stated that competition "is the
single most important source of innovation, efficiency and
growth in our economy. " CRef. 13 Rear Admiral Giordano,
SC, USN, Chief of the Supply Corps, further stated that:
CRef. £]
Competition makes good business sense, and I want to
make it clear that increasing competition must be a
primary objective of all personnel involved in logistics
management.
£'. The Navy Competi.ti.on Advocate General.
On 4 August 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
officially stated the Department of the Navy Acquisition
Management Policy. One of the 15 initiatives for immediate
action included in this policy was the establishment of the
Department of the Navy Competition Advocate. Naval Material
Command (NAVMAT) Notice 5430 of 2 August 1983 officially
established the position, and named Commodore Stuart F.
Piatt, SC, USN, as the first Competition Advocate General
(CAG) of the Navy.
In his first letter to the newly designated field
competition advocates, the Navy CAG stated: CRef. 3D
Competitive procurement represents the extension of the
principle of fairness into the defense acquisition
process. The public trust placed in those who obligate
public funds includes the assurance that a fair
opportunity will be provided to all who can meet the
government's needs.
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One effective way to significantly reduce costs, and
thereby be able to afford our defense requirements, is
to increase the use of competition. The Navy is now
emphasising competitive procurement strongly.
Competition advocates were directed to underline their
commitment to the promotion of competition by action.
Active participation in all phases of the procurement
function were required, with the position to be such that
everyone in the acquisition process recognizes that sole
source would be considered only as a last resort. Extensive
review, planning, expansion in the use of commercial
specifications, and making use of market research were also
directed.
Standardization through the DOD parts control program
and the like equipment concept were two issues pursued by
Commodore Piatt. Standardization was viewed as being a
viable industry process, and could be applied to federal
programs to achieve the same results.
In May of 1984 Commodore Piatt went on record to state
that the competition advocacy program was working, and that
Navy managers were reaping the benefits of increased
efficiency, lower costs, and greater innovation CRef. 43.
He cited a 40V. increase in the amount of competition from
Fiscal Years 1982 to 1983, and noted that *2tt0 million had
been saved by competitively awarding contracts on two
classes of ships CRef. 53.
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3. The ComBeti.ti.on i.n QQDtract i_ng B£t '2f i?Qft
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984,
(Division B, Title VII, of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
CPublic Law 98-3693), was a compromise of S. 338, H. R. 5184,
and H. R. £545. It made amendments to the two primary
procurement directives of the Federal Government, the firmed
Services Procurement ftct (ftSPft) and the Federal Property and
Administrative Services fict (FPflSft). The fict, known as
"Title VII," applies to all solicitations issued after 31
March 1985.
Title VII establishes competitive proposals and sealed
bids as the two competitive procedures to be used by Federal
Government. Sealed bids are to be used if four factors s^re
met. First, they must be used if time permits the
solicitation, submission, and evaluation of the bids.
Second, sealed bids must be used if the award is made on the
basis of price and other price-related factors. Third, if
it is not necessary to conduct discussions, sealed bids must
be employed. Finally, sealed bids must be used if there is
a reasonable expectation of receiving more than one bid. If
these criteria cs^n not be met, competitive proposals must be
requested CRef. 63.
Title VII deviates from previous policy in stating that
procurement officials no longer 3.re required to document his
reasons for choosing competitive proposals over sealed bids,
or vice versa CRef. 73. This gives government procurement
1£1
personnel much the same latitude enjoyed by private industry
in the source selection process.
Another issue raised by Title VII is that the head of an
agency may use competitive procedures, but exclude a
particular source, in order to establish or maintain an
alternative source or sources. This C3^r\ be done only if it
will result in maintained or increased levels of competition
and will reduce overall procurement costs CRef. 8D
.
Title VII also allows the head of an agency to limit
competition to small business concerns only, but only if all
firms within the category are allowed to compete. This does
not affect the provisions of Section 8<a) of the Small
Business Act CRef. 9U.
Sole source procurement is specifically addressed in
Title VII, making such a procurement practice unlawful for
the first time unless one of seven specific exceptions a.re
met CRef. 183.
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C. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
1. Discussion
Prior to 1 April 1984, there was no single volume
containing all government -wide acquisition regulations.
Three basic regulations, the Defense Acquisition Regulation
(DAR) , the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Procurement Regulation (NASA PR), and the Federal
Procurement Regulation (FPR) formed the basis for all
government procurement guidance.
IE".
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), integrated the
three regulations into one clear, understandable document
designed to make it easier for government employees to
procure goods and services and for contractors to conduct
business with the Federal Government.
£• Development of the FAR
Congress had laid the foundation for the FAR in
1974 under the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act,
Public Law 93-400. One of the principle articles of this
act was to "establish a system of coordinated - and to the
extent feasible - uniform procurement regulations for the
executive agencies." CRef. ID
The project officially began in January of 1978 when the
Department of Defense and the General Services
Administration agreed, with the assistance of NASA and other
procuring agencies, to take the lead in developing the
regulat ion.
The project was divided into three phases. Phase One,
under the direction of DOD and GSA, established project
offices and drafted and published the initial regulation for
industry and agency review. During Phase Two, industry and
agency comments were reviewed by OFPP, which sent them to
the appropriate drafting office for consideration and
evaluation. The FAR drafting groups then evaluated all
comments and recommendations, recording on a permanent
record their disposition and the rationale behind it. Phase
i£4
Three was titled the "Executive Review," in which the three
regulatory agencies - DOD, GSA, and NASA - assisted by other
agencies, reviewed the FAR draft to ensure that it was
suitable for operational use in the field.
The FAR became effective on 1 April 1984, being
published as Chapter 1 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR). Customer agencies were afforded the
ability to implement their own FAR supplement, however these
regulations were not to conflict with, restate, or
paraphrase the FAR. They were to conform to its numbering
system, and were also to be published in Title 48 of the
CFR.
The material in the FAR was organized to promote
clarity and ease of use. To better fit the normal flow of
the acquisition process, the various topics were arranged in
generally the same order that one would follow in the
preparation of the procurement workpackage.
The FAR is divided into eight subchapters designated by
the letters A through H. Each of these subchapters is
further divided into parts, numbered consecutively from 1 to
53. (Numbering does not begin anew with each subchapter,
however. ) The parts Are then further broken down into
subparts, sections and subsections. These are further
divided into paragraphs, subparagraphs, and subdivisions.
To accomodate the simplified restructuring of the
regulations, a new numbering system was developed. The
first digit (s) represent the part number, followed by a
decimal point. The numbers after the decimal point
represent the subpart, sections, and after a dash,
subsection and any further definition. To illustrate, part
52, subpart 2, section 27, subsection 1 appears as 52.227—1.
4. M^iDt=lD£D£s of the FAR
FAR subpart 1.2 covers the FAR maintenance system.
Two councils have been named to jointly maintain the FAR:
the DAR council (DARC) , with NASA included, and the Civil
Agency Acquisition council (CAA) , chaired by GSA. The CAA
council has 12 civil agencies included that provide major
procurement missions to the Federal Government.
These councils will solicit comments from all interested
parties and coordinate agreement on the proposed changes to
the regulation. The final recommendation is then submitted
to the FAR Secretariat at GSA, who will review and implement
the change if found to be acceptable.
5. Supplementing the FAR
While the FAR is meant to be a single source of
guidance for acquisition matters, it was recognized by the
drafting committees that agency-specific regulations would
have to be allowed.
In order to keep the system as simple as possible
throughout its applications, agencies ca.ri not repeat or
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revise material contained in the FAR. The format and
numbering scheme set forth in the FAR Part 1 must be
strictly adhered to. Only those unique, internal
requirements necessary to implement the FAR in each
organization will be allowed in its FAR supplement.
6. iQlESet of the FAR
Government officials who worked closely with the
development of the FAR announced that the FAR contained no
major policy changes from prior regulations. However, major
transition problems were found in the civilian government
agencies and those industry contractors who had dealt almost
exclusively with the Federal Procurement Regulation (FPR)
.
Those agencies who had worked under the Defense Acquisition
Regulation (DAR) found the transition much easier.
Other problems were voiced by both industry and
government managers. Resistance to change was great, and
training became a t irne-consurning process for the federal
workforce. Industry viewed the FAR as falling short of the
"sweeping reform" promised by OFPP in the 1982 Proposal for
a Uniform Federal Procurement System. Stating that only one
major change is offered by the FAR, the revision of the
contract award formal advertising clause <5£. £14-1©) , some
viewed this as being a very "fragile and limited" tool CRe.f.
a:.
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The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 ("Title
VII") applies to all solicitations issued after 31 March
1385. Several issues in this Act affect the procedures as
set forth in the FAR.
First, Title VII establishes two competitive procedures:
"sealed bids" and "competitive proposals." Sealed bids must
be used if time permits the solicitations and evaluation
process to be completed, award is on the basis of price and
other price—related factors, if discussions are not
required, and if there is a reasonable expectation of
receiving more than one sealed bid. Any deviation from
these points requires that competitive proposals be
requested.
A second issue is the requirement in Title VII for
federal agencies to use advanced procurement planning and
market research to achieve full and open competition through
the use of proper specifications and timely solicitations.
While not totally new to procurement policy, Title VII lends
more emphasis to this issue.
Title VII reduces the uniform threshold for submission
of cost or pricing data from $500, 000 to $180, 000. However,
the legislation does not define the terms "cost data" or
"pricing data" and provides no guidance for use of either.
Small purchase is affected by Title VII. Civilian
agencies under the Act are authorized to purchase up to
1£S
a new ceiling of $£5,800. The FAR addressed special
procedures for small purchase, but Title VII directs this
comment to the civil branch of procurement.
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D. THE WEAPON SYSTEM WARRANTY
1 . P_iscussion
Section 794 of the Fiscal Year 1984 Department of
Defense Appropriations Act requires that written guarantees
be obtained in connection with the procurement of weapon
systems. The section provides that before DOD ca.r> obligate
or spend appropriated funds for the procurement of a weapon
system, the contractor must warrant that the system and its
components a^^e designed and manufactured to conform to
performance requirements, and are free from all defects in
materials and workmanship that could affect performance.
1£9
£• Devel_oBrnerit of the Guarantee Issue
The flir Force implemented expanded use of
warranties under DAR Section 1—324 in 1378 when General A.
D. Slay, Commander of the flir Force System Command, ordered
application of guarantee clauses to procurement programs
such as the flir-Launched Cruise Missile and Advanced Medium
Range Air-To-Air Missile CRef. 13. The Army published AR
78£-13 in January of 1981, setting forth the Army policies
for their warranty program CRef. £3. Aside from these two
programs, little was done in other federal agencies until
the DAR council reviewed the area in their evaluation of the
material to be included in the FAR CRef. 33.
The real drive behind warranty reform came from Senator
Mark Andrews in his amendment to the Fiscal Year 1384
Department of Defense Appropriation Act, H. R. 4185. This
legislation, provided in draft form to industry for comment
in mid- 1983, was written with an intent to create a
commercial marketplace environment out of the DOD
acquisition process. Industry replies were often strongly
worded, indicating that the proposed legislation would only
widen the rift between Government and the private sector,
and that it was "hopelessly out of phase with economic
reality. . . and common sense. " CRef. 43
However, congressional support clearly backed the issue,
and on 8 December 1983 the bill was implemented into law.
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3. The W^CtZ^Dty EtI2Y.i5i'2ti=:
The Fiscal Year 1984 Defense Appropriations fict , as
implemented by the 14 March 19S4 DOD Guarantee Policy
Guidance, requires all DOD fixed—price type production prime
contractors for weapon systems to provide a guarantee
provision CRef. 53.
The guarantee must be one of two mandated types. The
first, a conformance to performance requirement warranty,
requires that if a test or demonstration is required by the
contract, a failure to pass this evaluation will result in
the contractor taking all required action necessary to
conform the item to the contract sepecif icat ions. fill costs
incurred during this performance would be bom by the
contractor. The same contractor efforts are required if a
performance requirement details 3ir> operation of the system
for a specified period of time, and problems are encountered
in achieving this requirement.
The second type of guarantee required by the Oct is that
at the time of delivery to the Government, the contractor-
warrants the weapon system and each significant component of
it to be free from defects in material and workmanship that
may cause the system to fail the specified Government
performance objectives.
In both of these types of warranties, the contractor is
obligated to reimburse the Government for any costs incurred
by the Government in procuring such parts from another
131
source or making the necessary repairs, if the contractor
does not take "prompt" action to achieve the specified
performance requirements himself.
4. Ihe DOD Guidance
Experiencing difficulties within DOD on the proper
way to apply the warranty legislation to defense
procurement, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer issued
a 98 day blanket waiver of the requirement to all DOD on 16
December 1983. Concurrently with this waiver, a "Notice of
Draft Guidance on Written Guarantees" was developed and
subsequently published in the Federal Register on £2i January
1984. This notice requested that comments on the guarantee
issue be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
within 30 days CRef. Gl
.
The magnitude of responses rec ieved over the draft
prompted numerous reviews and discussions. The dismay of
DOD over the warranty legislation prompted a Senate Armed
Services Committee investigation into the provisions in late
February, resulting in the realization that there had been
inadequate hearings held before the enactment of the
legislation, and that, in fact, complex issues remained to
be resolved. Further hearings were directed.
On 14 March 1984 the final DOD guidance regarding the
implementation of the warranty provision was issued. A GAO
review of the guidance was ordered to determine the degree
of compliance with the original legislation, resulting in a
13£
statement by GAO that the guidance was consistent with the
requirement, but that it also found significant imprecision
in the language of the original law CRef. 7D.
The final guidance addressed three major areas: the
waiver of the application of the guarantee provision to all
cost reimburesement type contracts; a refinement of the
definition of a weapon system; and the authorization for
contracting officers to use greater discretion in tailoring
the guarantee to particular components of a weapon system.
In addition, as an aid to the contracting officer, the final
guidance provides a "model clause" to be used in fixed-price
type contracts. This does not exclude the writing of
"custom" guarantee clauses, however, to fit the needs of
each particular contract.
5. The Fiscal Year 1985 Defense Author i. zation Act
Effective 1 October 1984, the Fiscal Year 1985
Defense Authorization Act approved some new warranty
language and regulations.
Three major areas of change a.re found in the Act
pertaining to weapon system warranties. The first was in
the redefining of several fundamental terms. A "weapon
system" or "other defense equipment" is now defined as an
item or items that can be used directly by the armed forces
to carry out combat missions. This greatly enlarges the
coverage afforded over previous legislation.
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A second issue was in the contractors "prompt" action to
correct failures. The language has been reworded to reflect
that in all situations where the contractor is prepared to
promptly remedy the breach of guarantee, he should be
allowed to do so. The key word here is "promptly, " with the
Government being placed in the position to determine what a
reasonable length of time should be, and what constitutes a
contractors reasonable effort to promptly correct the
deficiency.
One of the most widely debated portions of the new Act
was the issue regarding the deletion of the requirement for
performance guarantees on the intitial production of a new
weapon system. The intent of the change was to allow a
reduction of risk to the contractor during the volatile
first stages of production. By allowing this, the
contractor and the Government will have a more accurate and
reasonable proposal upon which to base full-scale production
contracts, since they will both have a better understanding
of the capabilities of the new system.
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